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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SHIFT TOWARD
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN ELECTION LAW
JoshuaA. Douglas*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Election law is experiencing immense change. The Supreme
Court's recent approach to election law cases has significant
implications for the scope of the right to vote and the meaning of
political participation and self-governance. This Article examines the
importance of the Court's recent pronouncement that plaintiffs can bring
election law challenges only as applied to a particular political actor for
a particular situation, instead of challenging a law in its entirety.' The
"as-applied only" rule may seem like simply a procedural method for
construing election laws or a mere semantic distinction, but, as I show,
in reality the Court's decisions have significant substantive
ramifications.
Shortly before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board,2 upholding the right of states to require
that voters show a photo identification to vote, noted election law
scholar Professor Rick Hasen warned of the perils of a ruling that
narrowed the scope of election law litigation solely to as-applied
challenges.3 He explained that such an approach would make those laws
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Edward C. Prado, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. Special thanks to David Fontana, Rick Hasen, Stefanie Lindquist, Donne Marchetto,
Joseph R. Oliveri, and Michael J. Pitts for advice on drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Drew
Gulley and the staff of the Hofstra Law Review for their invaluable editing assistance.
1. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193-95
(2008).
2. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008).
3. Rick L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stagefor Shrinking Voting Rights,
Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Mar. 26, 2008,
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.htm; see also Tony Mauro, Supreme
Court Upholds Indiana Voter ID Law Just Before Primary, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1209373541997 ("Hasen adds that if laws like Indiana's
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"no longer ...subject to facial challenges. That means, in turn, that the
laws will have to be in effect for a while before they are challenged, and
that they will cause damage in the interim, at a minimum." 4 He also
posited that this approach would have an adverse effect on poor and
minority voters.
This Article seeks to determine if the Court's recent rulings in
Crawfordand Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party6 had, in the short term, a detrimental effect on voters' rights. Was
it more difficult for voters during the 2008 election cycle to vindicate
their rights because the Supreme Court boldly stated that plaintiffs may
bring election law challenges only as applied? Have judges now
conferred on states an almost unfettered ability to regulate their
elections, to the detriment of voters, advocacy groups, candidates, and
political parties? Is there a better approach to election law that can
replace the facial or as-applied dichotomy?
To discern whether these two significant election law cases in the
2007 Term had an effect on subsequent challenges to election
regulations, I analyze federal election law decisions from both 2004 and
2008. If the Court's pronouncements in Washington State Grange and
Crawford had an immediate impact on the landscape of election law
litigation, then we would expect to see lower federal courts in 2008 more
easily rejecting broad constitutional challenges to election laws because,
even if the law might be unconstitutional in another setting, it is valid as
applied to that particular political actor. Further, when plaintiffs win an
election law case, the relief will likely be narrow in scope.
Washington State Grange and Crawford may have impacted federal
court decisions in two ways: First, there could be a direct impact,
whereby courts cite the cases for the proposition that only as-applied
challenges are appropriate. Second, there could be an indirect impact, in
that federal courts portend an overall wariness to issue broad decisions
striking down election regulations. Of course, we will need several more
election cycles to fully understand the ultimate effect of these cases. For
now, my research shows that these cases had a slight but noticeable
immediate impact and that the Court's pronouncements have altered the
way in which federal courts analyze election law cases. These decisions
do not represent a sea change in the law but instead foretell a more
must now be challenged 'as applied,' that is 'going to make it tough for a lot of plaintiffs who are
burdened' to make their case.").
4. Hasen, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195.
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nuanced approach that gives states wider leeway in regulating their
election processes.
Uncovering the effect of the Court's focus on as-applied challenges
helps to measure the underlying value of the right to vote.' This
conclusion reinforces the premise that the right to vote is a judge-made
right and that the scope of that right generally depends on the individual
judges deciding these cases. Of course, at a basic level, we all know that
judges decide close election law disputes-the 2000 presidential election
and the 2008 Minnesota Senate recount provide high-profile examples of
this proposition.8 What is less obvious is that judges have tremendous
power in shaping the right to vote for the operation of everyday
elections.
In the 1960s, Supreme Court Justices conferred a high value on the
right to vote and sought to protect the right against state encroachment,
often by striking down election regulations on their face. 9 Judges used
facial challenges to effectuate widespread changes in how states
regulated their elections, with the upshot being greater protection for
individual voters. Today, judges are narrowing the scope of the
individual right to vote through the use of decisions that construe
election laws only as applied to those who bring suit; Washington State
Grange and Crawford were the catalysts for the current zenith in that
trend. 10 The as-applied rule from Washington State Grange and
Crawford has allowed federal judges to swing the pendulum toward
favoring government regulation at the expense of political actors, such
as voters. This Article therefore reinforces the idea that seemingly
routine judicial rules-such as a preference for facial or as-applied
challenges-play an important role in shaping the right to vote.

7. See generally Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court's
Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 89 (2009) (discussing the underlying messages
in the Court's recent election law cases as they impact the public sphere); Nathaniel Persily &
Jennifer Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy? The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of AsApplied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644
(2009) (examining the implications of the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges in
election law).
8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (halting the recall effort in Florida and effectively
deciding the disputed election between the presidential candidates); John Schwartz, Minnesota
Justices Are Skeptical in Senate Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A10. The Minnesota Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the dispute between Norm Coleman and Al Franken shortly
before the printing of this Article. See Sheehan v. Franken, No. A09-697 (Minn. June 30, 2009) (per
curiam),http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/sc/current/OPA090697-6030.pdf.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
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Ultimately, this analysis provides a cogent explanation of how judges
define the meaning of political participation.11
The following discussion explains the pitfalls of the Court's current
focus on as-applied challenges for election law cases. Facial challenges
are better than as-applied challenges at vindicating the rights of many
voters at once. Without facial challenges, a law might be in force in
perpetuity even though its application to a certain set of voters is
unconstitutional, because no one has brought a successful as-applied suit
to challenge that application of the law. In the process, not only do some
voters suffer an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, but there
can also be a chilling effect on voters' political participation.
However, the Court has also provided cogent reasons for why facial
challenges to all election laws are inappropriate, such as the desire to
12
avoid constitutional questions and protect legislative prerogatives.
Therefore, I conclude that the Court should abolish the "as-applied only"
rule and instead adopt an approach more favorable to the ideals of
protecting voters' rights and providing clarity, but less onerous than a
rule that requires courts to uphold or strike down a law on its face in all
instances: the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. This middle
ground allows courts to vindicate the rights of voters who suffer an
unconstitutional burden without impinging too much on the rights of
states to regulate their elections. It requires courts to sever an
unconstitutional application of an election law even if the law is valid as
applied to the voter who brought suit, thereby saving most of the law but
excising the unconstitutional portion.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Following this introduction in
Part 1, Part II discusses the history of election law litigation in terms of
facial versus as-applied challenges. Part III analyzes federal court of
appeals, district court, and state court cases that have cited Washington
State Grange and Crawford and aggregates election law decisions
during 2004 and 2008 to determine the effects of the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncement that election law challenges should only be as
applied. Part IV explains the importance and implications of judicial
rules such as these in the democratic process. Finally, Part V argues that
the Court should eliminate the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges in its election law jurisprudence and adopt, as a middle
ground, the overbreadth doctrine in its place.

11. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 722-30 (1994).
12. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
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II.

THE SHIFT FROM FACIAL TO As-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN
ELECTION LAW

When the Supreme Court entered the business of deciding the
constitutionality of election regulations, it typically did so through the
lens of facial challenges. Only recently has the Court backed away from
striking down election laws on their face, instead preferring the
piecemeal approach of as-applied litigation. Lower courts have followed
suit. This Part explores that shift.
A.

Facial Versus As-Applied Challenges

Whether a court considers the constitutionality of a statute under a
facial or as-applied approach is crucial both to the method of
jurisprudence and to the ultimate outcome. 3 Facial challenges present a
completely different path from as-applied challenges; whereas a facial
challenge asks whether a statute is constitutional in all of its
applications, in an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff must show only that
the law is invalid in that particular situation. 14 Each method of
examining a statute has distinct interpretative rules and, therefore,
different implications for constitutional jurisprudence.' 5 Of course, the
terms "facial" and "as-applied" are less than precise, and courts and6
scholars have struggled to clearly define the two approaches.1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recently attempted to distinguish
the doctrines, particularly in election law cases, so it is important to
13. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2005)
("Few areas of law more sharply present the issue of the Court's role in implementing the
Constitution than the law governing facial and as-applied challenges to statutes.").
14. See Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 236 (1994). Professor Richard Fallon disagrees with this dichotomy, suggesting that "there is
no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation." Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324
(2000). Fallon notes that although a litigant "must always assert that the statute's applicationto her
case violates the Constitution" the deciding court "will typically apply a general norm or test and, in
doing so, may engage in reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality." Id. at
1327-28. Professor Matthew Adler takes a different view, arguing that all challenges to statutes are,
at their core, facial challenges. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of
American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157-58 (1998). My analysis reveals that the
Court's election law jurisprudence has carved out a stark distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges.
15. The doctrines also create much confusion for courts and scholars. See Edward A. Hartnett,
Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative
Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1748 (2006) ("Supreme Court jurisprudence is in
disarray concerning facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.").
16. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 157-58; Dorf, supra note 14, at 239-42; Fallon, supra
note 14, at 1327-28; Gans, supra note 13, at 1339-41.
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begin with a discussion of the differences between these methods of
constitutional adjudication.
1. Facial Challenges
Facial challenges allow courts to vindicate the rights of many in
one fell swoop. The starting place for understanding how the Supreme
Court analyzes a plaintiffs request to strike down a law in its entirety is
the Court's 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno.' 7 In that case, two
criminal defendants challenged the Bail Reform Act's 18 pretrial
detention provisions, asserting that the law violated due process by
allowing the government to detain defendants based on a finding of
future dangerousness. 19 The Court noted that "[a] facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid., 20 In essence,
the Court required the criminal defendants to show that the law would be
unconstitutional in every single conceivable application.2'
Several commentators have noted that in analyzing a facial
challenge, a court interprets the law in the abstract, devoid of context in
the application of the law to the real world.22 As Professor Massey notes,
"courts are incapable of assessing effects in facial challenges cases
because there are no effects to be observed., 23 Thus, "there is room for
courts to treat facial challenges as a form of constitutional
prophylaxis." 24 Simply put, the Court asks itself whether the government
may enforce the law in question against any person and in any situation.
If there is a conceivable way in which to enforce the law, then the Court
will reject the facial challenge.
The Court's general rejection of facial challenges has several
implications for challenging a statute. First, plaintiffs typically have a
harder time winning their case. They must show that the statute, beyond
the application to them, is unconstitutional. Second, states may innovate
in the way they use their police powers without worrying that a court
17.

481 U.S. 739 (1987).

18. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-50 (2006)).
19. Salerno, 481 U.S. at743-44.
20. Id.at745.
21. See Gans, supra note 13, at1335-36.
22. Id.at 1337; Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purposein ConstitutionalJudicial
Review, 59 S.C. L.REV. 1, 54 (2007).
23. Massey, supranote 22, at 54.
24. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss3/1

6

Douglas: The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in Ele
2009]

AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN ELECTION LAW

will strike down all applications of a given law. In Sabri v. United
States,25 the Court chastised the petitioner for his strategy of bringing a
facial challenge, stating that "facial challenges are best when
infrequent., 26 The Court noted that although invalidating a law on its
face might be "efficient in the abstract," any gain would be offset by
"losing the lessons taught by the particular." 27 When a court invalidates
an entire law on its face, states have a harder time learning which
applications are permissible versus impermissible. Third, rejecting facial
challenges allows the Court to avoid making sweeping decisions that
alter the landscape of how a state implements a statute or encroaching
upon legislative prerogatives, thereby adhering to the doctrines of
separation of powers and constitutional avoidance.28 Based on these
doctrines, the Court can uphold most laws and avoid a difficult analysis
of the law's constitutionality in various other settings. It is a lot easier to
reject a facial challenge and opine that a law might be unconstitutional in
a different, abstract setting than to provide clear answers on when
exactly a state can enforce the law. In sum, the Court generally prefers a
slow method of constitutional adjudication, in which it can consider
solely the application of a statute to particular situations.
2. As-Applied Challenges
In an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
the law is invalid when applied to that particular plaintiff.29 That is, a
state still can enforce the statute against most people, even if a court
strikes down certain applications of the law. 30 In this mode of
constitutional adjudication, a statute receives more deliberate
examination, whereby it can be applied in various settings-most
constitutional, but perhaps some unconstitutional. Importantly, the
plaintiff must challenge the application of the law to him- or herself, not
to a third party. "Under the as-applied model, courts implement
constitutional norms on a slower, more gradual basis.'

25.

541 U.S. 600 (2004).

26. Id. at 608.
27. Id.
at 609.
28.

See Persily, supra note 7, at 94; see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican

Party, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
29. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 424-25 (1998).
30. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881
(2005) (noting that "a successful as-applied challenge still allows the state to 'enforce the statute in

different circumstances"' (quoting Dorf, supra note 14, at 236)).
31.

Gans, supranote 13, at 1335.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37:635

As-applied challenges present significant hurdles for the
vindication of individual rights. In particular, the results of as-applied
challenges are gradual, with an individualistic focus. Change comes
slowly through an as-applied lawsuit because the court considers only
whether the statute violates the plaintiffs rights in that particular
instance, instead of more broadly. As one commentator noted, there are
considerable costs to as-applied jurisprudence: "Its gradualism and more
individualistic focus may, in certain circumstances, make more difficult
the enforcement of constitutional rights. 32 Thus, if a court holds a
particular statute unconstitutional as-applied, the government still may
enforce that statute in a different circumstance.3 3
B. FacialChallenges in Election Law
The Warren Court of the 1960s brought about a significant growth
in rights vindication in election law. Throughout the decade, the
Supreme Court persisted in striking down election regulations that
deprived individuals of their constitutional right to vote. 34 Importantly,
the Court did not provide protection on a case-by-case basis, solely
invalidating particular applications of laws for certain individuals.
Instead, the Court struck down numerous laws in their entirety that made
explicit distinctions on who enjoyed the benefits of the franchise.3 5 Thus,
the Court did not widely defer to the states to determine who could vote
or wait to see the actual effects of an election regulation, but instead
struck down various laws on their face. An analysis of these cases
reveals that the Court used the vehicle of facial challenges to usher in
widespread election reform in quick fashion.
For example, several states sought to limit the eligible electorate in
certain elections to those who the state determined actually had a
particularized vested interest in the outcome. 36 Consider Cipriano v. City
of Houma, in which the Court analyzed a Louisiana law that gave only

32. Id. at 1336 (discussing the "costs of case-by-case adjudication").
33. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 236.
34. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528,
533-34 (1965).
35. See, e.g., Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33; Harman, 380 U.S. at
533-34.
36. See, e.g., Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706 (striking down a Louisiana law that gave only
"property taxpayers" the right to vote in elections regarding a municipal utility's issuance of
revenue bonds); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33 (invalidating a law that prohibited otherwise eligible
people from participating in district meetings and local school board elections).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss3/1

8

Douglas: The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in Ele
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN ELECTION LAW

2009]

"property owners" the right to vote in certain elections. 37 The Court held
that the state had not met its burden of justifying the law, particularly
given the 'exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which
selectively distribute the franchise.' 38 The Court required the state to
justify the disparate treatment of voters in every situation to which the
statute might apply and struck down the law on its face.
Similarly, in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, the
Court considered the effect of a law that granted the franchise to some
eligible voters but not to others, analyzing not only the application of the
law to the named plaintiffs but also to various other categories of
potential voters.39 The voters successfully secured a ruling that the

statute violated all voters' rights, not just the voters who challenged the
law.

40

In case after case in the 1960s, the Court considered facial
challenges to election laws that potentially affected wide classes of
otherwise eligible voters. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,a t the Court invalidated Virginia's poll tax without any
discussion of whether the poll tax actually affected the plaintiffs who
brought the challenge. 2 That is, there is no indication from the Court's
opinion that the named plaintiffs in Harpercould not have paid the poll
tax, but this did not stop the Court from considering a challenge to the
law on its face. In some ways, therefore, the Court actually applied an
overbreadth analysis, concluding that the poll tax at issue was
unconstitutional once the state applied it to other valid voters even if the
law was not necessarily invalid as applied to the named plaintiffs.43
Voting is so important that the Court allowed the named plaintiffs to
bring suit to vindicate the rights of others who might be denied the
franchise because of the overbroad poll tax. However, even though
37. Cipriano,395 U.S. at 706.
38. Id.(quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632).
39. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630 ("Besides appellant and others who similarly live in their
parents' homes, the statute also disenfranchises the following persons (unless they are parents or
guardians of children enrolled in the district public school): senior citizens and others living with
children or relatives; clergy, military personnel, and others who live on tax-exempt property;
boarders and lodgers; parents who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are
too young to attend school; parents who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose
children attend private schools.").
40. Id. at 633.
41. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
42. Id. at 666; see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1965) (invalidating, on
its face, a Virginia law that required voters in federal elections either to file a certificate of residence
each year or, at their option, pay a poll tax).
43. Dorf, supranote 14, at 267; see also infra note 267 and accompanying text.
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casting a ballot is a form of "speech,"" the Court has never expressly
adopted the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine for election law.45 As
I discuss in Part V, this approach actually makes perfect sense for
voting, a purportedly fundamental right.46
The reapportionment cases during the 1960s similarly brought
about wholesale changes via facial invalidation to how a state drew its
electoral maps.

47

For example, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that

Alabama's attempt to redraw its state electoral districts was
unconstitutional, as the state's plan had the effect of making some votes
in the state count more than others.48 The case presented a direct attack
on the law for all voters and all districts, not just for the particular
plaintiffs who brought suit.
Thus, the election law decisions of the Warren Court embodied the
height of using facial challenges to strike down election laws wholesale.
The Burger Court of the 1970s and early 1980s began a gradual, albeit
implicit, erosion of this practice. During this period, the Court began to
construe election laws as applied to the particular plaintiff who brought
suit and ignore potential facial challenges, even though it did not
explicitly highlight this distinction. For example, in Storer v. Brown,49
the Court analyzed a California ballot access law that limited who could
appear on the ballot 5° and determined that "if a candidate is absolutely

and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he
5
cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates." '
Thus, even if the ballot access law might be unconstitutional in some
52
settings, that alone was not enough to invalidate the provision.

44. See, e.g., Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlightingan
Inconsistent Considerationof Election Fraud,44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,25 (2009) (noting that

voting "is a right so fundamental that its protections are found twice in the U.S. Constitution: the
First Amendment right to political speech, expressed through voting, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of the act of voting as a fundamental right").
45. One commentator suggests that the Court implicitly employed the overbreadth doctrine in
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). See John F. Decker, OverbreadthOutside the First
Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 81-82 (2004).
46. See infra Part V.

47. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536-37, 585-87 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 370, 380-81 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88, 237 (1962).
48.
49.

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536-37.
415 U.S. 724 (1974).

50. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27.
51. Id. at 737.
52. Id. at 736-37 ("Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the
constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in
combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly
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Similarly, in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee,53 the
Court held that Ohio could not constitutionally apply its campaign
disclosure requirements to the Ohio Socialist Workers Party, but the
Court chose not to rule on the facial validity of the law. 54 Cases like
these, which quietly rejected facial challenges in favor of a piecemeal asapplied approach, provided the foundation for the more recent and more
explicit strict interpretation of the facial/as-applied dichotomy in election
law cases.
C. As-Applied Challenges in Election Law
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
facial challenges while inviting as-applied challenges to laws regulating
election administration." For example, in McConnell v. FederalElection
Commission,56 the Court rejected a facial challenge to prohibitions on
electioneering communications, 57 but in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
FederalElection Commission,5 8 the Court ruled that McConnell had not
foreclosed the possibility of a plaintiff bringing a successful as-applied
challenge to these provisions. 59 This demonstrates how the Court has
generally closed the door to facial challenges to election laws while at
the same time opening the door to considering piecemeal lawsuits
regarding particular applications of a law. The Court has exhibited a
willingness to wait before it overturns the entirety of an election
the application of that law plays
regulation, instead preferring to see how
60
election.
actual
an
of
context
the
in
out
During the 2007 Term, the Supreme Court heard two cases that
directly involved a state's ability to promulgate election rules and
explicitly invoked the facial/as-applied distinction. 61 In both cases, the
unconstitutional, [these candidates] were still properly barred from having their names placed on the
1972 ballot.").
53. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
54. Id. at 101-02.
55. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 597-98 (2005) (rejecting a facial challenge to
Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system).
56. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
57. Id.at 206-09.
58. 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
59. Id. at412.
60. But see Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2771-74 (2008). As I explain
below, the Court seemed to indicate in Davis that the statute inherently violated a candidate's First
Amendment rights, meaning that it was invalid in all situations. See infra text accompanying notes
115-17.
61. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008); Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). The Court heard two other election law cases
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Court sided with the state, determining that states enjoy wide discretion
in handling the "nuts-and-bolts" of election administration. 62 The Court
had been leaning toward rejecting facial challenges in other contexts for
years,63 but the decisions in Washington State Grange and Crawford
signify the zenith of the Court's explicit admonition that it will allow
only as-applied challenges to attack an election law. Between the
Warren Court's facial invalidation of many election laws in the 1960s
and the Roberts Court's explicit rejection of facial challenges in
Washington State Grange and Crawford, the Court had implicitly
rejected facial challenges in favor of an as-applied approach, but it had
not explicitly made this distinction. 64 As Professor Nathaniel Persily
explains, Washington State Grange and Crawford therefore reflect a
stark maturation in the Court's use of the facial/as-applied dichotomy for
election law, in that the cases "appear to signal a shift at least in the way
the Court discusses as-applied and facial challenges, if not in what the
Court means by the distinction. 6 5 As I discuss below, this shift presents
significant ramifications for how judges shape the scope of the right to
vote.66 It also leads to negative implications for the protection of voters'
rights. The effects of these cases show why the Court should refocus its
election law jurisprudence. My solution, as presented more fully in Part
V, is to abolish the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
that Washington State Grange and Crawford solidified in favor of a
more lenient overbreadth standard. Before reaching a solution, however,
we must precisely understand the holdings in these cases and why the
Court's approach is a cause for concern.
1. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party
In Washington State Grange, the Court considered Washington's
newly enacted primary scheme.67 Previously, Washington's voters
selected the candidates for the general election through a "blanket
during the 2007 Term, but neither explicitly invoked the facial/as-applied doctrine. See Davis, 128
S. Ct. at 2765; N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 795 (2008). As Persily

and Rosenberg point out, "In the context of campaign finance, regulation of political parties, and
voter identification requirements, the opinions of the Roberts Court have discussed the as-

applied/facial issue to a degree never before seen in an election law case." See Persily & Rosenberg,
supra note 7, at 1658-59.
62.

See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1658-59.

63. See, e.g., Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
Persily, supra note 7, at 96.
See infra Part IV.
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1187-88 (2008).
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primary" system.68 In a blanket primary, candidates from all parties
appeared on one ballot, and all voters selected from among those
candidates, with the candidate receiving a plurality of votes within each
major party moving on to the general election. 69 After the Supreme
Court invalidated a similar blanket primary system in California
Democratic Party v. Jones, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down Washington's blanket primary system. 71 In response, Washington
State Grange, a civic organization, proposed an initiative to replace the
invalidated primary system.72 The citizens of Washington approved the
new initiative, and it became effective in December 2004. 73
Under the new primary system, a candidate for office must declare
74
his or her "'major or minor party preference, or independent status."'
In turn, the primary election ballot designates each candidate's party
preference.7 5 The political party cannot disassociate itself from a
candidate; thus, for example, a candidate who holds ideals repugnant to
the Republican Party could list his or her party preference as Republican,
and this preference would appear next to his or her name on the primary
ballot. All voters can vote in Washington's primary elections, and the
two candidates who receive the most and second-most votes move on to
the general election, regardless of their stated party preferences. 76
Immediately after the law went into effect, the Washington State
Republican Party filed suit, challenging the law on its face.77 The
Republican Party argued that the law violated its First Amendment right
to freedom of association, because the law required the party to associate
with a candidate whom the party did not necessarily endorse.7 8 In
essence, the Republican Party asserted that the law was facially invalid
because the party was forced to associate with any candidate claiming
party affiliation.79
The Supreme Court focused its analysis on the pre-election nature
of the case-that is, the Republican Party challenged the law in the
68. Id.
69. Id.at 1188.
70. 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
71. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003).
72. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1189.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.24.030 (West 2005)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Washington State Democratic Central Committee and Libertarian Party of
Washington State joined the Republican Party as plaintiffs. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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abstract, not in the context of an actual election. 80 The Court noted that

"[t]he State has had no opportunity to implement [the new primary
system], and its courts have had no occasion to construe the law in the

context of actual disputes arising from the electoral context, or to accord
the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.",8' Lest

readers not understand that this was the crux of the analysis, the Court
reiterated this point several times.8 2 In particular, the Court focused on
the fact that because the Republican Party challenged the primary system

on its face, "we have no evidentiary record against which to assess their
assertions that voters will be confused.,

83

The Court warned that it could

not speculate about "hypothetical" or "imaginary" cases, 84 as
"[e]xercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge 'frees the Court not
only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also
from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their
constitutional application might be cloudy."' 85 The Court wanted to see a
clear demonstration of what the ballot would look 86like under the new

primary system before ruling on its constitutionality.

To support its decision, the majority took pains to emphasize that a

facial challenge was inappropriate in this situation. The majority likely
focused on this point to mask what seems to be an obvious fallacy in the
Court's analysis: Although it might be helpful to see the actual ballots

80. Id. at 1190-91.
81. Id.at1190.
82. See, e.g., id. at 1191 (noting that facial claims rest on "speculation"); id. at 1193 ("We
reject each of [the Republican Party's] contentions for the same reason: They all depend, not on any
facial requirement [of the law], but on the possibility that voters will be confused as to the meaning
of the party-preference designation. But [the Republican Party's] assertion that voters will
misinterpret the party-preference designation is sheer speculation."); id. ("But these cases involve a
facial challenge, and we cannot strike down [the law] on its face based on the mere possibility of
voter confusion."); id. at 1196-97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("But because [the Republican Party]
brought this challenge before the State of Washington had printed ballots for use under the new
primary regime, we have no idea what those ballots will look like.").
83. Id. at 1194 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 1190.
85. Id. at 1191 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). The Court
distinguished a second type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context, whereby a court
might construe a law to be overbroad because a "'substantial number' of its applications are
unconstitutional, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' Id. at 1190 n.6
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-71 (1982)). The Court warned for that this second
type of facial challenge, "[w]e generally do not apply the 'strong medicine' of overbreadth analysis
where the parties fail to describe the instances of arguable overbreadth of the contested law." Id.;
see also Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 763 n.23 (5th Cir. 2008). The bulk of the Court's
decision regarding as-applied challenges and election administration, however, did not involve this
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
86. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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and the way in which they designate a candidate's party preference, the
Court's decision in Washington State Grange seemed divorced from the
87
reality of how voters would actually construe the meaning of the ballot.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, voters who viewed the new
ballots would obviously understand that they conveyed a political
message that connected a party and a candidate, regardless of what the
ballots actually looked like or how they read. 8 Indeed, given the Court's
decision in Washington State Grange, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
in which the Court will strike down any election regulation on its face
before the state implements that law. If the Court simply could
"imagine" a ballot design that would convey the message that the party
and candidate were not politically associated, then the Court could
probably imagine a similar scenario for any election law so as to
construe it as constitutional. Simply put, the Court essentially eliminated
the possibility of a pre-election facial challenge to any election law. As
the Justices themselves noted, the only open avenue to challenge this
type of law is through an as-applied challenge, when the Court can see
the costs and benefits of using a particular law in an actual election.8 9
2. Crawfordv. Marion County Election Board
The Court used its new precedent in Washington State Grange to
send these same messages in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board.90 In Crawford,a political party, two elected officials, and several
nonprofit organizations that represented groups of elderly, disabled,
poor, and minority voters challenged Indiana's requirement that voters
show a photo identification to vote. 9 1 Although the Court held that the
87.

Another explanation is that narrowing the focus to an as-applied challenge helped to

create consensus on the Court. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1646 n.6. But, as Persily

and Rosenberg point out, "The Court's decision rejecting the facial challenge conflates two
problems: the absence of a ballot (or state court interpretation) implementing the law and the
absence of actual confusion arising from whatever ballot format the state employs." Id. at 1666.
88. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1202 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It does not take a study to
establish that when statements of party connection are the sole information listed next to candidate
names on the ballot, those statements will affect voters' perceptions of what the candidate stands
for, what the party stands for, and whom they should elect."). Another manner of understanding the
Court's approach is through the lens of ripeness and constitutional avoidance. See Persily, supra

note 7, at 96; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1663-64. Ultimately, the Washington ballots for
the 2008 election stated "(Prefers Republican Party)" or "(Prefers Democratic Party)" under the
candidate's name. See Sample Ballot - Kitsap County, Washington (Nov. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.kitsapgov.contm/aud/elections/archive/08/sample%20ba/ 20t%2gen%202008.pdf.

89. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195 ("That factual determination must await an asapplied challenge.").
90. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); see also Persily, supra note 7, at 96.
91. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
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plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law, 92 it rejected the plaintiffs'
facial challenge.93 The plaintiffs had argued that the voter identification
law unduly burdened the right to vote for elderly, poor, and homeless
voters and those who had a religious objection to being photographed.9 4
Noting the "heavy burden of persuasion" for a facial challenge, the
Court determined that the record was insufficient to invalidate the law.95
The Court stated, "on the basis of the evidence in the record it is not
possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully
96

justified.,

For example, the Court found that the record was devoid of a
reliable indicator of how many registered voters did not have photo
identification. 97 The Court also stated that there was no "concrete"
evidence of the burden the law imposed on voters without an
identification.98 Similarly, "[t]he record says virtually nothing about the
difficulties faced by either indigent voters or voters with religious
objections to being photographed." 99 Thus, the plaintiffs had failed to
00
show that the statute lacked a "plainly legitimate sweep."'
However, the Court implicitly invited as-applied challenges to the
law: The lead opinion noted that record evidence and facts of which it
could take judicial notice suggested that Indiana's voter identification
law might impose a heavier burden on certain voters.' 0' In particular, the
law might adversely affect elderly persons born out-of-state, people who
would have difficulty obtaining a state-issued identification because of
economic or other personal limitations, homeless people, or people with
a religious objection to being photographed. 10 2 Although the Court
discounted the burdens that the law imposed based upon the record
before it, it left open the possibility that these groups of voters could still
challenge the law.' 0 3 The Court stated, however, that "even assuming
that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

97.

Id.

1615 n.7.
1622-23.
1621.
1622.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1623 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184,
1190 (2008)).
101. Id. at 1621.
102. Id.
103.

Id.
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by no means sufficient to establish petitioners' right to the relief they
seek [(facial invalidation)] in this litigation."'1 4
The Court provided further guidance in a footnote, offering an
explicit example of when the law might go too far:
Presumably most voters casting provisional ballots will be able to
obtain photo identifications before the next election. It is, however,
difficult to understand why the State should require voters with a faithbased objection to being photographed to cast provisional ballots
subject to later verification in every election when the [Board of Motor
Vehicles] is able to issue these citizens special
licenses that enable
105
them to drive without any photo identification.
Thus, although the Court would not invalidate the law on its face, it
provided, in effect, an advisory opinion regarding when the law would
overreach. Presumably, religious voters who object to being
10 6
photographed can successfully challenge the law as applied to them.
As two election law commentators have suggested, this approach
perhaps represents a "pragmatic" compromise, in that
this model does discourage courts from second-guessing the overall
reasonableness of controversial legislative enactments (reducing the
risk of judicial conflict with the party-in-government), and it may help
to lower the stakes of voting rights litigation (which, one might hope,
will in turn reduce the likelihood
that judges' partisan preferences will
07
influence their decisions).1
Cutting the other way, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion seems to
curtail the propriety of as-applied challenges to election regulations.108
Justice Scalia advocated for an approach that provides clear answers, in
which the Court determines whether a law imposes disproportionate
burdens on certain voters (presumably in the abstract) and whether those
burdens are too severe. 0 9 The Court therefore should not consider
whether a law imposes a severe burden on the particular voter who
104. Id. (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 1621 n.19.
106. One voter was already unsuccessful in his as-applied challenge to Indiana's law. See
Stewart v. Marion County, No 1:08-CV-586, 2008 WL 4690984, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008).
However, the plaintiff in that case did not present the hypothetical facts that the Supreme Court
suggested could lead to a successful as-applied challenge (a religious voter who objected to
obtaining an identification with a photograph). See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 n.19.
107. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 507, 535 (2008).
108. Cravford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. Id. at 1624-25.
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brought suit given that voter's specific circumstances."l 0 It follows that a
holding "that burdens are not severe if they are ordinary and widespread
would be rendered meaningless if a single plaintiff could claim a severe
burden.""' Justice Scalia explicitly recognized the pitfalls of
encouraging as-applied litigation in this setting, given that "[t]his is an
area where the dos and don'ts need to be known in advance of the
election" and "[a] case-by-case approach naturally encourages constant
litigation.

'

12

Thus, it seems that one reason Justice Scalia concurred

only in the judgment was his disagreement that the voter identification
law might be invalid as applied to certain individuals." 3 Justice Scalia
wanted to go further and hold the law constitutional in every application;
that is, rule that the law is facially valid." 14
The import of these two cases is not necessarily that every election
law plaintiff must bring his or her suit only as applied. For example, in a
recent campaign finance case, the Court struck down the so-called
"Millionaire's Amendment" on its face, stating that Congress could not
allow disproportionate campaign finance limits for opponents of selffinanced candidates." 5 But in that case, the Court seemed to indicate that
because of the inherent First Amendment implications of the law, there
was no meaningful way for the statute validly to apply to some
candidates and not to others." 6 Once a self-financed candidate
contributed a certain amount to his or her own election campaign, the
statute automatically raised the contribution limit for that candidate's
opponent."17 Thus, even if an opposing candidate never actually took
advantage of the increased contribution limit, the law still "harmed" the
self-financed candidate by opening the door to unequal contribution
opportunities. Further, the Court is arguably more hostile to campaign
finance regulations than to run-of-the-mill election laws, so it is possible
that the Court was more receptive to remedying a theoretical harm from

110. Id. at 1625.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1626.

113. Id. at 1624 ("The lead opinion assumes petitioners' premise that the voter-identification
law 'may have imposed a special burden on' some voters, but holds that petitioners have not
assembled evidence to show that the special burden is severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny[.]
That is true enough, but for the sake of clarity and finality (as well as adherence to precedent), I
prefer to decide these cases on the grounds that petitioners' premise is irrelevant and that the burden
at issue is minimal and justified.") (citations omitted).
114.

See id.

115. Davis v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008).
116. Id.
117. 1d.at2770.
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a campaign finance provision.' 18 In this circumstance, the Court struck
down the law in its entirety.1 19 Accordingly, I do not argue that the only
way to achieve success in challenging a law that regulates an election is
to bring an as-applied challenge.12 Rather, potential plaintiffs should be
cognizant that, based on the Court's pronouncements in Washington
State Grange and Crawford,the Court
has shifted its focus to prefer as21
applied litigation in election law.
3. Recent Lower Court Decisions
Before looking at the larger trends in election law litigation
stemming from Washington State Grange and Crawford, it is interesting
to note that lower courts deciding recent election law disputes have
seemed to mimic the Supreme Court's approach, rejecting facial
challenges while inviting litigation regarding election laws as applied to
particular voters, candidates, or political parties. This suggests that the
implicit message from the Supreme Court had begun to trickle down to
lower courts even before Washington State Grange and Crawford,
laying the groundwork for lower courts' immediate and explicit
application of the rule after the Supreme Court's decisions in these
cases. It further underscores that Washington State Grange and
Crawford did not dramatically alter the election law landscape but were
instead catalysts for making this trend more pronounced and explicit.
For example, in Miller v. Brown122-- decided before Washington
State Grange and Crawford-the Fourth Circuit rejected a facial
challenge to Virginia's open primary law but ruled that the law was
unconstitutional as applied to the particular situation in that case, in
which a political party wished to exclude those who had voted for a

118. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court I
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 09-198, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1338895.
119. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
120. Further, this analysis is not meant to suggest that the Roberts Court rejects facial
challenges wholesale. In addition to Davis, the Court sustained a facial challenge to the District of
Columbia handgun ban in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). See Metzger,
supra note 118, at 8-9.
121. Compare McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (rejecting a
facial challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002)), with Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007)
(holding the same statute unconstitutional as applied to the specific advertisements in that case).
Persily and Rosenberg suggest that the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life came close to striking down
every application of the law in question by carving out an exception to the law that almost
swallowed the rule. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1662-63.
122. 503 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2007).
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candidate of a different party from participating in the primary. 123 The
court found that the law was permissible in the abstract because Virginia
provided parties with several ways to exclude voters in the candidateselection process, but that the State had failed to justify the burdens the
law imposed in this situation given that the incumbent had selected, as
was his choice, a primary for this election.' 24 Thus, the court preferred a
slower adjudication, allowing the State of Virginia to regulate its
election but striking down those applications that went too far.
Similarly, in Alaskan Independence Party v. Alaska125-- decided in
October 2008, after Washington State Grange and Crawford-the
political party argued that Alaska's mandatory direct primary system, in
which all candidates on the general election ballot had to be "'nominated
in a primary election by a direct vote of the people,"' violated its
associational rights. 126 The party contended that the state's mandatory
primary improperly compelled it to nominate its candidates through a
primary election instead of a convention and unfairly permitted
candidates to claim affiliation with the party even if that candidate did
not espouse the party's beliefs. 27 The Ninth Circuit rejected the party's
facial challenge to the mandatory primary system.' 28 The court instead
required the party to show that the law impermissibly forced it to
29
associate with a particular person who did not share the party's values.
Moreover, the court held that the proper way to challenge the state's law
regarding whether it impermissibly allowed candidates who did not
agree with the party to claim affiliation was through as-applied
litigation. 130 Thus, the party was unsuccessful in its facial challenge, but
the court
opened the door to possible future as-applied challenges to the
31
law.'
Another similar trend stemming from this mode of adjudication is
that lower courts often try to narrow their holdings, especially when
invalidating an election regulation. As the Second Circuit noted when
holding that it was unconstitutional for New York to deny absentee
123. Id. at371.
124. 1d. at 368, 371.
125. 545 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2008).
126. Id. at 1175 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.010 (2008)).

127. Id. at 1177, 1180.
128. Id. at 1180.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1181 (stating that "to the extent Appellants argue that certain specific candidates for
office have been improperly certified by Alaska in the past, these challenges would be properly
brought on an as-applied, not facial, challenge") (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008)).
131.

Seeid.
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ballots for elections for political party county committees when it
provided absentee ballots for every other election,
[t]he fact pattern here is unusual, and our holding in this case is
necessarily narrow. We do not hold that there is a general
constitutional right to obtain absentee ballots. Nor do we hold that
there is a constitutional right to obtain absentee ballots in all county
committee races in New York State. Instead, after applying a
deferential standard of review, and after examining the record in this
as-applied challenge, we conclude that the arguments proffered by the
State are so extraordinarily weak that they cannot justify the burdens
imposed by Election Law § 7-122.132
Of course, circuit courts have not altogether rejected the possibility
of invalidating an election law on its face. In striking down a North
Carolina campaign finance regulation as violative of the First
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit recognized that striking down the law as
applied would simply lead to additional litigation, with little resolution
of the underlying issues. 133 Therefore, there is not an absolute rule
against facial challenges but instead a preference, in most situations, for
piecemeal adjudication through as-applied litigation. This preference has
increased in the wake of Washington State Grange and Crawford,
showing that, while there was a mild preference for as-applied litigation
before these cases, the Court's pronouncements have been catalysts for
further rejection of facial challenges to state election regulations.
In sum, based on a quick survey of recent circuit court cases, it
seems that although lower courts may have implicitly understood that
facial challenges are disfavored in election law cases, Washington State
Grange and Crawford solidified and increased the practice of rejecting
facial constitutional challenges and limiting election law cases to asapplied litigation. But this does not explain whether these two Supreme
Court cases significantly altered the results in election law decisions. An
examination of federal circuit and district court cases before and after
these two Supreme Court cases will demonstrate whether voters,
advocacy groups, political parties, and candidates now have a harder
132. Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2008).
133. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2008). The court stated,
The number of as-applied challenges necessary to remedy the over-breadth and
vagueness of this multi-factored statutory test would involve many different lawsuits and
litigation that would take years to conclude. In the meantime, political speakers would be
left at sea, and, worse, subject to the prospect that the State's view of the acceptability of
the speaker's point of view would influence whether or not administrative enforcement
action was initiated.
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time in achieving wholesale changes to a state's election practice
because of these decisions.
III.

ANALYSIS OF 2004 AND 2008 ELECTION LAW CASES

The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board may have been the most significant election law case
since Bush v. Gore.'34 The debate over voter identification was deeply
partisan and continues to rage.13 5 As I observed above, lying beneath the
surface of this partisan debate-and the decision in Washington State
Grange-was an explicit shift in how the Court views election law
challenges. This Part seeks to determine whether the Court's decisions in
Washington State Grange and Crawford had an immediate impact on
how voters, candidates, or political parties may bring constitutional
challenges to election regulations. To that end, I have analyzed the cases
that have cited these decisions so far and have compared the success
rates of constitutional challenges to election regulations before and after
the Court's 2008 decisions. Although the sentiment against facial
challenges may have already been present underneath the surface of
lower courts' election law decisions, Washington State Grange and
Crawford made the distinction between facial and as-applied litigation
more explicit, thereby altering the outcome in some cases and making it
easier for states to defend their election regimes.
A.

Cases Explicitly Relying upon Washington State Grange and
Crawford

One measure of determining if Washington State Grange and
Crawford have had an immediate impact is to study the manner in which
lower courts have cited these two decisions. The analysis shows that
these cases affected the way in which political actors were able to
134. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (finding that the Florida Supreme Court's
method for recounting votes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but
ruling that no other method was possible within the short time period before Florida needed to
certify its electoral votes). The decision effectively resolved the 2000 presidential election in favor
of George W. Bush.
135. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638-44 (2007)
(providing a summation of voter identification measures); Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing
the Impact of Photo Identificationat the Polls Through an Examination of ProvisionalBalloting,24
J.L. & POL., available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1287735 (forthcoming
2009) (empirically assessing the effect of Indiana's voter identification laws on voters during the
2008 primary election); Kelley Shannon & Jay Root, Democrats Stop Voter ID Bill, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 27, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6442809.htm
(discussing the Texas legislature's attempt to enact a voter identification law).
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challenge a government's electoral practice and also influenced the
procedure for other non-election law constitutional challenges.
136
In the year subsequent to the Court's decision in Crawford,
federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and state courts have cited
Washington State Grange sixty times and have cited Crawford thirtyfour times. 137 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of lower courts'
reliance on these cases is that many of them have nothing to do with
election law.' 38 Instead, courts have cited Washington State Grange and,
to a lesser extent, Crawford, for general principles of law regarding the
availability of as-applied challenges in various settings.

136. As Crawford is the later of the two cases, I have confined my research to the year
following this decision, that is, all decisions citing either case through April 28, 2009. This cut-off
date is inherently arbitrary, but it allows for a full year's analysis of the trickle-down effect of both
cases. Reviewing all lower court decisions within a year of Crawford(as opposed to within a year
of Washington State Grange)makes sense in light of the fact that Crawford strongly reinforced the
original as-applied ruling in Washington State Grange. Thus, the combination of these two cases
sent a particularly strong signal regarding the proper approach to challenging an election regulation.
This analysis therefore also includes the three cases that cited Washington State Grange between the
date of that decision, March 18, 2008, and the date of the Crawford decision, April 28, 2008. Those
three decisions are: In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008) (decided on
April 11, 2008), Nat'lAss'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (decided on April
11, 2008), and Skynet Corp. v. Slattery, No. 06-cv-218, 2008 WL 924531 (D.N.H. Mar. 31, 2008).
None of these three are election law cases, and all cited Washington State Grangefor the general asapplied proposition.
137. See app. tbls.1 & 2, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Joumals/
LawReview/lrv issuesv37n03_CC1-DouglasAppendix.pdf.
138. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2008),
amended and rehearing denied, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that the Federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-24b (2006), did not preempt the
Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211-26 (LexisNexis 2007), and citing
Crawford for the proposition that plaintiffs bear a heavy burden when bringing a facial challenge);
In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 711 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the denial of a
motion to remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2000), and
citing Washington State Grange for the proposition that a court should rest its decision on the
narrowest ground possible).
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Law
Cases
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Cited for
As-Applied
Proposition

Cited for
Something
Other than
As-Applied
Proposition

Washington

56

4

16

44

56

8139

32

2

23

11

9

28140

State
Grange

Crawford

Table 1: Cases Citing Washington State Grange and Crawford within

One Year after the Court Decided Crawford on April 28, 2008
Forty-four of the sixty decisions citing Washington State Grange
are not election law cases. 14 1 All of these cases cited Washington State
Grange solely for the general proposition that courts prefer as-applied
instead of facial challenges. 142 Thus, it appears that Washington State
Grange had a somewhat significant impact on all constitutional
adjudication, not just election law cases. This comports with the Roberts
Court's general disposition against facial challenges. 43 That is, the
immediate impact of Washington State Grange has been to solidify the
Roberts Court's preference for as-applied litigation, 44 both in election
law and other cases.
Only sixteen cases citing Washington State Grange dealt directly
with an election law issue, 145 and of those cases, twelve cited the
decision for the as-applied proposition. 46 When cited in an election law
case, therefore, the as-applied holding had a significant impact on lower

139. Note that in four of the eight cases, the courts cited Washington State Grange for both the
as-applied proposition and another proposition. See app. tbl. 1, supra note 137.
140. Note that in three of the twenty-eight cases, the courts cited Crawford for both the asapplied proposition and another proposition. See app. tbl.2, supranote 137.
141. See app. tbl.l, supranote 137.
142. See app. tbl.l, supranote 137.
143. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 15, at 1758; Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the
Era of Maintenance,59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 959 n.318 (2008); Metzger, supra note 118.
144. See Metzger, supra note 118.
145. One case that cited Washington State Grange was merely the remand of that case to the
Ninth Circuit. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Washington, 545 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir.
2008). 1have excluded this remanded case from my analysis.
146. See app. tbl.1, supranote 137.
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courts' decisions. By contrast, only two cases cited Washington State
Grange for its actual substantive holding: that the First Amendment
protects the right of a political party to choose its own nominee for
public office. 14 7 Of course, this holding is not widely applicable, so the
fact that courts have not relied upon it is not particularly surprising.
What is more noteworthy is that the as-applied holding from Washington
State Grange has had a vibrant independent life. Only four of the sixty
cases that cited Washington State Grange did not cite it for the standard
regarding facial versus as-applied challenges; all four instead cited the
recent formulation of the "severe burden"
decision as the Court's most
48
cases.1
law
election
test for
Thus, the data demonstrate that the main impact of Washington
State Grange so far has been its ruminations on facial versus as-applied
challenges. This holds true for both election law cases and cases
involving challenges to other types of statutes. That is, Washington State
Grange represents a higher hurdle for all plaintiffs who wish to vindicate
their rights against a governmental practice, not just voters. Instead of
having a unique impact on election law, the focus on as-applied
challenges has had broader implications for various types of statutes that
plaintiffs believe go too far. By contrast, Washington State Grange
seems to have had much narrower consequences on the substantive
election law issue the Court decided. In sum, the legacy of Washington
State Grange may very well be the channeling of litigation seeking to
overturn statutes to as-applied challenges, but not solely for election law
cases.
It appears that Crawfordwill have a slightly different legacy. Of the
thirty-four cases that cited Crawford within a year of the decision,
twenty-three involved a challenge to a state's election practice.149 That
is, in comparison to Washington State Grange, Crawford has had a
narrower impact on other areas of the law and is used mostly in election
law cases. Lower courts cite Crawford for a range of propositions. Of
those thirty-four cases citing Crawford, merely nine do so for the

147. Alaskan Independence Party v. Alaska, 545 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008); Kurita v.
State Primary Bd. of the Tenn. Democratic Party, No. 3:08-0948, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7, *16
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2008).
148. Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
McPherson, No. C06-4670, 2008 WL 4183981, at * 14-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008); Walton v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Revenue, No. 4:08CV596, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41477, at *30 (E.D. Mo. May 23,
2008); Mowles v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 958 A.2d 897, 904 (Me.
2008).
149. See app. tbl.2, supra note 137.
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nine cases were election law

decisions.15'
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50

Six of those

By contrast, the majority of

lower court cases citing Crawford did so for other propositions relating
to election law, such as the constitutionality of photo identification

laws 152 or the general recitation of the "severe burden" test. 153

Finally, Washington State Grange and Crawford have had very

little impact on state courts, and state judges most often cited these cases
in election law decisions. State judges cited Washington State Grange

only four times, twice in cases involving election law and three times for
the as-applied proposition. 154 Similarly, state courts cited Crawford only
twice, both times in an election law case and both times for Crawford's
substantive holding. 55 Accordingly, neither case has had a major impact

on state courts, but, much like the federal courts, state courts are more
likely to cite Washington State Grange for the as-applied proposition

and Crawfordfor its holding on voter identification.
As this discussion indicates, with regard to limiting lawsuits to asapplied challenges, Washington State Grange and Crawford work in
tandem. Washington State Grange applies broadly to all types of

constitutional disputes and stands for the proposition that facial
challenges are disfavored. Crawford,by contrast, applies more narrowly,
mostly to election law cases, and lower courts cited that decision for a
wide range of concepts, including the channeling of election law

150. See app. tbl.2, supranote 137.
151. See app. tbl.2, supranote 137.
152. See, e.g., Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11 th Cir. 2009); Am.
Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2008); NAACP v.
Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
153. See, e.g., Lemons v. Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008); Walton, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 41477, at *30-32.
154. See Abbott v. Burke, No. M-969, 2009 WL 1064462, at 66 (Trial Order) (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. Mar. 24, 2009) (Opinion/Recommendations to the Supreme Court) (citing Washington
State Grange for the as-applied proposition in a case about state funding for schools); Independence
Inst. v. Coffman, No. 07CAI 151, 2008 WL 5006531, at *4 (Colo App. Nov. 26, 2008) (citing
Washington State Grange in an election law case for the as-applied proposition); Mowles v.
Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 958 A.2d 897, 904 (Me. 2008) (pointing to
Washington State Grange in an election law case for the proposition that "[tihe 'mere possibility of
voter confusion' is insufficient to establish a compelling state interest" (quoting Wash. State Grange
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2008))); In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal
Church Prop. Litig., CL 2007-0248724, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85, at *11 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 27,
2008) (citing Washington State Grange for the as-applied proposition in a case not involving
election law).
155. See Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 27 n.4 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (citing Crawford for its substantive holding regarding voter identification); Las
Vegas Convention & Visitors Auth. v. Miller, 191 P.3d 1138, 1155-56 n.98 (Nev. 2008) (citing
Crawford in an election law case for its substantive holding).
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challenges to as-applied litigation. This also holds true for state court
cases, although state courts have cited these decisions much less often.
Most important for the purposes of this Article, lower courts have used
both cases several times to reject plaintiffs' facial challenges to both
election laws and other laws.
Therefore, what we see is a gradual shift limiting the ability of
voters and others to vindicate their rights. Lower federal court decisions
citing Washington State Grange and Crawford show that they do not
represent a sea change in the law, but the tides are certainly turning. This
makes sense, as one staple of Supreme Court jurisprudence is its
adherence to gradual change. 156 But it still should sound an alarm
regarding how judges define the scope of the right to vote, as I discuss in
Part IV.
Any conclusions we can draw from this analysis, however, are
necessarily opaque, as lower courts' records in citing these cases have
been mixed. Washington State Grange stands for the proposition that
plaintiffs in all areas, including election law, typically may vindicate
their rights only through as-applied challenges, while Crawford stands
for various propositions more specifically related to election law. In the
next sub-Part, I explore whether these cases were also catalysts for an
unstated general movement in the law disfavoring broad challenges to
election regulations.
B.

Comparisonof 2004 and 2008 Lower Federal Court Decisions

Washington State Grange and Crawford signify the Court's desire
to allow governmental entities to experiment with various election
regimes, making it even harder for political actors to challenge election
laws. Even if courts do not directly cite these cases, the Court sent the
signal that judicial temperament toward election law should be to protect
the power of the states in managing elections, thereby making it harder
for political actors to vindicate their rights. The default is now to uphold
the government's election regime.
Comparing federal election law decisions in 2004 and 2008 is one
logical way to discern whether the Court's rejection of facial challenges
had an immediate adverse effect on voters' rights. 157 The 2004 election
156.

See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 301 (1996)

(arguing that "measured" change in constitutional adjudication allows for stability and protects the
judiciary from political activism).
157. Of course, this is not to say that all of the cases in 2008 involved the 2008 election, as
several cases dealt with previous elections and simply reached the courts in this year. I use 2004 and
2008 merely as measurement tools to analyze the manner in which courts decide election law cases.
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cycle was rife with election law litigation, particularly because 2004 was
a presidential election year. 158 The 2008 election was similarly full of
election-related litigation, and most of these cases came down after the
Court rendered its decisions in Washington State Grange and
Crawford.'59 Thus, the political and judicial landscape was largely the
same in these years, 160 and one major difference was the Court's
decisions in these two cases. In essence, cases during 2004 provide a
"control" group, with the intervening Supreme Court cases potentially
altering how lower courts approached election law decisions in 2008.
Lower courts immediately take notice of new Supreme Court case law,
so this analysis presents one simplified manner of discerning the impact
of Washington State Grange and Crawford. Although not a perfect
measure, comparing election law cases in these two years will provide
an initial indication as to whether voters now have a higher burden as a
result of these cases.
The Court decided Washington State Grange on March 18, 2008,161
and Crawford on April 28, 2008,162 well before the November 4, 2008
election. In 2008, only one federal court of appeals decision (out of
fifteen) and seventeen district court decisions (out of eighty-six)
considering the constitutionality of an election law came down before
the Court decided Washington State Grange. 63 Thus, there was ample

time for the general principles surrounding Washington State Grange
and Crawford to have an immediate impact on the lower courts, and in
turn, on the political process during the 2008 election.

Further, courts during presidential election years are no doubt more involved in judicial rulemaking
for elections during this time, when the issues are particularly ripe. See Persily, supra note 7, at 89
(noting that the Court often decides election law issues that "have immediate thematic relevance to
the ongoing campaign, even when the Court is not actually deciding a case that grows out of the
campaign itself. Such was the case with the Supreme Court's election law docket from the 20072008 term and the historic 2008 election.").
158. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-29
(2007) (finding a large increase in election litigation since 2000); Charles Anthony Smith &
Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The Judicialization of PresidentialElections, 6
ELECTION L.J. 251, 252-53 (2007).

159. As I discuss below, I exclude from my analysis lower court decisions in 2008 that came
down before the Supreme Court issued Washington State Grange, the first of these two cases. See
text infra Part II.B.
1-.2; see also infra note 166.
160. Of course, by 2008, there were more President George W. Bush appointees on the federal
bench; the influence of political ideology on election law cases is an area that requires further study.
161. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
162. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
163. See app. tbls.5 & 6, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Joumals/
LawReview/lrvissues v37n03_CCI-DouglasAppendix.pdf.
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My analysis is not intended to demonstrate a direct impact from
these cases to a statistically significant level for the entirety of election
law. The sample sizes are too small to make any definitive conclusions. I
have also omitted a comparison of state court cases during these periods
in an effort to simplify the analysis, especially given that these Supreme
Court decisions directly bind state courts only when the courts construe
federal law. Instead, I make a narrower finding from this data: There is a
discernable trend of federal judges becoming more likely to favor the
governmental entity in election law cases. Thus, although not
statistically significant, I surmise that the evidence discussed below
shows that current judicial temperament-stemming in particular from
the as-applied rule in Washington State Grange and Crawford-is to
uphold the government's election-related conduct.
1. Courts of Appeals
The federal courts of appeals seemed slightly less likely to strike
down an election law in 2008-after Washington State Grange and
Crawford-as compared to 2004. Courts of appeals rendered seventeen
reported decisions on the constitutionality of a state's election regulation
in 2004.164 The courts upheld the election law in its entirety in eight of
these cases, meaning that the state won 47.1% of the time.' 65 For
comparison purposes, when omitting the three cases that the courts of
appeals decided from January 1, 2004, to March 18, 2004 (the date in
2008 when the Supreme Court decided Washington State Grange),166 the

164. See
app.
tbl.3,
available
at
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/
LawReview/lrv issuesv37n03_CCI-DouglasAppendix.pdf. In this analysis, I use the word

"state" as an overarching term to include the governmental entity that promulgates a particular
election law under review.
165. 1 have placed a case that upholds one part of a law but strikes down another portion in the
"law struck down" column, as the court struck down at least part of the state's election scheme. By

invalidating even a portion of a law, the court is altering the status quo and essentially telling the
state that it has gone too far in promulgating its electoral processes. Even if a court upholds part of a
law, therefore, its action in invalidating another portion sends a powerful message about the limits
of governmental regulation of elections. For example, in Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 654,

675-77 (6th Cir. 2004), the court struck down seven and upheld two Kentucky election law statutes.
Because the panel decision struck down a portion of the state's election code, this case falls into the
"law struck down" bucket.
166. For comparison purposes, I analyzed cases decided between March 18 and the end of the
year in both 2004 and 2008 (the Court decided Washington State Grangeon March 18, 2008). If the
as-applied rule from Washington State Grange and Crawford trickled down to lower courts, one
would expect to observe this trend beginning with Washington State Grange. Crawford, the later
case, reinforced this rule. Accordingly, it makes sense to measure the effect of these decisions from
the first case stating the new rule.
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state's success rate rises to 50.0% (the court upheld the state's regulation
in its entirety seven of fourteen times).
In 2008, the federal courts of appeals made a substantive ruling
about the constitutionality of a particular election law in fifteen cases
and upheld the law in its entirety in nine of them, meaning that the state
won in 60% of the cases. 167 Only one of these cases came down before
the Court's decision in Washington State Grange on March 18, 2008;168
as the state lost that case, 169 omitting it from the analysis brings the
government's success rate up to 64.3%. In short, governmental entities
were slightly more successful in defending their election schemes in
2008: after Washington State Grange, the state won 64.3% of the time,
and in 2004 for the same time period, the state won only 50.0% of the
cases. Thus, the federal courts of appeals seemed more likely to reject an
election law challenge in 2008.170 Although it is impossible to know
definitively if Washington State Grange and Crawford were directly
responsible for this shift or if there are simply too few cases to signify an
actual change, it does suggest that the road to challenging the
constitutionality of a state's election regulation may have become
slightly steeper.

167. See
app.
tbl.4,
available at
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Joumals/
LawReview/lrvissuesv37n03_CC 1-DouglasAppendix.pdf.
168. Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008).
169. Id. at 377.
170. Again, I do not mean to suggest that these results are statistically significant. Rather, they
provide a glimpse into the overall trend in the federal courts.
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All cases
decided in
2004
Cases decided
between Mar.
18, 2004 and
Dec. 31, 2004
All cases
decided in
2008
Cases decided
between Mar.
18, 2008
(Washington
State Grange)
and Dec. 31,

At Least Part of
Law Invalidated

Law Upheld in Its
Entirety

9

8

47.1%

7

7

50.0%

6

9

60.0%

5

9

64.3%

Government's
Success Rate

2008
Table 2: Federal Courts of Appeals Invalidation of Election Laws,
2004 and 2008

Because the sample size is so small, an examination of the types of
cases in which the court struck down an election law provides a more
cogent analysis. As mentioned above, in 2004 the federal courts of
appeals struck down a state's election practice nine times. 171 Several of
these cases may have gone the other way after the Court closed the door
to facial challenges. Consider Anderson v. Spear.'72 Hobart Anderson
sought to conduct a write-in candidacy in Kentucky's gubernatorial
election.' 73 In October 1999, before the election, he brought suit, seeking
an injunction and declaratory judgment that several of Kentucky's
election laws were unconstitutional.174 He alleged that the laws in
75
question prohibited him from conducting several campaign activities.'
But he did not bring an as-applied challenge, asserting that the state had
unconstitutionally applied the laws to him during the election; rather, he
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supranote 165.
356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 654.
Id.
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brought a pre-election facial challenge. 76 Although the election in
question had already taken place, the Sixth Circuit struck down several
of the provisions.' 77 For example, the court held that Kentucky's 500foot "buffer zone" around a polling place, within which a candidate
could not distribute literature, was overbroad.178 This is a proper
application of the overbreadth doctrine, as it is particularly warranted for
all types of election laws, not just those that impact political expression
or other First Amendment ideals. 179 Unlike in an as-applied approach,
however, to win on this claim, the court did not require Anderson to
show that he attempted to hand out literature or that the state was going
to apply the law specifically to him. Instead, the court allowed him to
bring a successful facial challenge to the law.' 80 The court also struck
down the definition of "contribution" in the state's campaign finance
laws as facially unconstitutional because it did not include a candidate's
contributions to his or her own campaign accounts.' 81
Under the current Washington State Grange/Crawford regime,
however, Anderson may not have prevailed on his facial challenges.
Instead, the court would have had to consider whether the 500-foot
buffer zone, as applied to Anderson's attempt to distribute materials
within the zone at a particular polling site, violated that candidate's
constitutional rights. A court might find, for example, that a 500-foot
buffer zone is perfectly appropriate for some precincts but not for others
given the arrangement of the precinct and the amount of intrusive
campaigning at that site. The proper inquiry would be whether a 500foot barrier presented an unconstitutional burden at the polling sites
where Anderson sought and was denied the ability to campaign.
Similarly, the definition of "contribution" may have been constitutional
in certain applications but not others, which is exactly when, under
Washington State Grange and Crawford,only an as-applied challenge is
appropriate. Thus, the push toward as-applied challenges in the 2008
election law cases-and the concomitant rejection of pre-election
challenges-might have changed the outcome in Anderson.
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Heller'82 presents a
similar story. In that case, the American Civil Liberties Union brought a
176.

Id.

177. See generally id. (striking down seven Kentucky election law statutes). The court upheld
two of the provisions. See id. at 675-77.
178. Id. at 662-63.
179. See infra Part V.
180. Id. at 656.
181. Id. at 666-67.
182. 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
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successful facial overbreadth challenge to a Nevada law that required
certain groups or entities publishing campaign literature to reveal, in the
publication itself, the names and addresses of the publications' financial
sponsors. 183 A court, after Washington State Grange and Crawford,
might well conclude that the state was justified in requiring disclosure
for certain types of donors, or perhaps donations over a certain amount.
That is, a court might now be hesitant to strike down a disclosure law in
every circumstance, instead preferring piecemeal litigation to determine
when the disclosure requirement is appropriate. Of course, the court in
Heller determined that the law was overbroad under the First
Amendment,' s 4 so if the Court adopts the overbreadth doctrine for
election law cases generally, as I advocate below, then the rule from
Washington State Grange and Crawford would not apply. But the proper
approach is now less clear after these two decisions.
One more example drives home the point and highlights the notion
that Washington State Grange and Crawford gave states wider leeway to
experiment in their election schemes. In Green Party of New York State
v. New York State Board of Elections, 85 the Second Circuit upheld a
preliminary injunction against New York's application of one of its voter
enrollment regulations.18 6 Under the statute in question, if a political
party failed to receive at least 50,000 votes for that party's gubernatorial
candidate, the State Board of Elections was required to remove that
party's name from the voter registration form and convert all voters
affiliated with that party to non-enrolled status.1 87 The Second Circuit
held that the political parties had a substantial likelihood of prevailing on
the merits, implicitly stating that the law was unconstitutional.' 8 8 The
court limited its holding to the political parties listed in the injunction,
which comports with an as-applied challenge, as it affected only those
political parties who did not receive 50,000 votes in the gubernatorial
election but still could show a modicum of support. 189 Nevertheless, the
language the court used to describe the burdens the law imposed on the
parties and the failure of the state to justify those burdens suggests that
the law could not withstand constitutional scrutiny in any of its

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 981.
Id. at 1002.
389 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 422-23.
Id.at 415.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 422.
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applications. 90 Thus, the import of the court's decision was that the law
was invalid on its face. After Washington State Grange and Crawford,
however, the court may have been more hesitant to make this broad
pronouncement if it could consider only how the state had actually
applied the statute to the political parties in question. Perhaps there was
a setting in which the state could validly apply the law, such as if the
state coupled the 50,000 vote requirement with the lack of other
indicators that the political party remained viable. Accordingly, after
Washington State Grange and Crawford, the court might have been less
willing to make a sweeping statement on the validity of this election
regulation.
In 2008, by contrast, the courts of appeals were slightly more
stringent in sustaining only as-applied challenges. As mentioned above,
the federal courts of appeals struck down portions of a state's election
law in six cases.1 9' In the only decision that came before Washington
State Grange and Crawford,the Sixth Circuit invalidated an Ohio statute
that mandated petition circulators to be paid only on a per-time basis, as
opposed to per signature.' 92 Although the court did not say so explicitly,
its opinion reads as if the law was unconstitutional on its face. 193 The
five cases that came after Washington State Grange and Crawford
present more of a mixed bag. Notably, none of these cases cited
Washington State Grange or Crawford. In many of them, the courts
were careful either to clarify that the laws were invalid only as applied
or to emphasize that a successful facial challenge was
"'strong medicine
94
resort.""
last
a
as
only
and
sparingly
to be applied
As another example of a court's reluctance to strike down a law in
its entirety after Washington State Grange and Crawford, consider the
Second Circuit's approach in Price v. New York State Board of
Elections.'95 The court ruled that New York's failure to allow the voters
in question to vote absentee in the election for political party county
committee, even though the voters qualified for absentee ballots under
New York law for other elections, improperly burdened the voters' First

190. Id. at 420 ("We think the burdens imposed on plaintiffs' associational rights are severe.");
see also id at 421 (stating that "it does not appear that the challenged statutory provision is
necessary to achieve the state's asserted interest").
191. See app. tbl.4, supra note 167.
192. Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2008).
193. See id. ("The provision, however, runs afoul of the First Amendment because it creates a
significant burden on a core political speech right that is not narrowly tailored.").
194. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
Seniors Ass'n v. Social Sec. Admin., 423 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005)).
195. 540 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Amendment rights.1 9 6 Although the court did not cite either Washington
State Grange or Crawford, it took pains to emphasize that its holding
might not
applied only to these voters, suggesting that the law
197
impermissibly burden other voters in other circumstances.
However, even in light of Washington State Grangeand Crawford,
at least one court was willing to strike down a particular election practice
with little regard for whether the plaintiff challenged the statute on its
face or as applied. In Nader v. Brewer,198 the Ninth Circuit invalidated
Arizona laws that required circulators of presidential nomination
petitions to be residents of the state and nomination petitions to be filed
at least ninety days before the primary election. 199 The court stated that
these requirements severely burdened the rights of candidates and those
supporting them who were not from Arizona, and could not withstand
strict scrutiny review.200 Although seemingly outside of the "as-applied
only" rule of Washington State Grange and Crawford, this case actually
demonstrates how many laws simply are not amenable solely to a facial
or as-applied challenge and exemplifies how the distinction is often
blurred.20 ' Ralph Nader and many of his supporters were not from
Arizona, and the statute in question required petition circulators to be
from Arizona.20 2 A ruling that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to Ralph Nader meant that it was unconstitutional as applied to anyone
not from Arizona. As the statute affected only non-residents, there was
no possible way for the state to enforce its law against anyone other than
those similarly situated to Nader. 0 3 It follows that for Nader to succeed,
the court would have to hold the law unconstitutional in every
application. In this instance, there was no neat separation between asapplied and facial challenges. The Court's declarations in Washington
State Grange and Crawford about as-applied challenges to election laws
were largely irrelevant when applied to facts such as those in Nader.
This case also shows that the type of case matters. A court facing a facial
challenge to a voter identification law after Crawford most certainly will

196. Id. at 103-04.
197. Id. at 112; see also supra note 126.
198. 531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).
199. Id. at 1030-31.
200. Id. at 1040.
201. See generally Fallon, supra note 14 (discussing how there is no neat way to separate facial
from as-applied challenges).
202. Nader, 531 F.3d at 1030, 1032.
203. Id. at 1031; see also Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the Ohio Secretary of State "violated Nader's First Amendment rights when he enforced Ohio's
registration and residency requirements against Nader's candidate-petition circulators").
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reject that challenge in favor of an as-applied approach, but the rule
might not be as clear to lower courts for other types of cases.
None of this analysis presents a perfect measure of whether the
Supreme Court's decisions in Washington State Grange or Crawford
fundamentally altered the landscape of election law jurisprudence. The
statistical analysis shows only a minor shift; the description of the cases
reveals that some cases might have gone the other way. At most, we can
conclude that the courts of appeals are being particularly careful to limit
the scope of their rulings in election law decisions. The cases suggest
that it has become harder to bring a successful facial challenge to an
election regulation. Thus, what we see is a gradual change, whereby
governments are able to try out various election regimes with minimal
court interference. In the process, political actors such as voters,
candidates, or political parties have a harder time vindicating their rights.
That is, recent decisions in the courts of appeals show that judges have
swung the pendulum even further in favor of a governmental entity's
election scheme by narrowing the manner in which a plaintiff can
challenge an election law. The Supreme Court's decisions in Washington
State Grange and Crawford provide a cogent explanation for this recent
narrowing of voters' and others' rights.
2. District Courts
District courts rendered many more election law decisions than the
courts of appeals during these time periods; thus, a comparison of the
decisions in 2004 and 2008 provides further insight into whether voters
or other political actors are finding it more difficult to vindicate their
rights or obtain broad relief.
To determine if there has been a discernable shift after Washington
State Grange and Crawford, I catalogued every reported district court
decision from both 2004 and 2008 that ruled upon the legality of a
government's election law practice.2 °4 The plaintiffs in these cases were
204. See app. tbls.5 & 6, supra note 163. 1analyzed only cases that ruled one way or the other
on whether the government had acted unlawfully. Therefore, I did not include election law cases in

which the court addressed procedural matters or dismissed for a non-merit based reason, such as
lack of standing. See, e.g., Molinari v. Bloomberg, No. CV-08-4539, 2008 WL 5233854, *11

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (denying motion to transfer venue); Sajo v. Bradbury, No. CV 04-853,
2004 WL 1803324, *1 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2004) (dismissing case as moot). Additionally, I included

cases in which the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, as many election law cases fall under
this rubric, often not going beyond this stage. In a case involving a request for a preliminary
injunction, the court does not render a final decision on the constitutionality of the government's
action, but it does make an initial determination of whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits. See John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 33, 35 (2007) (noting that "the strength of the plaintiffs case under the substantive law-
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voters, voting advocacy groups, candidates, political parties, and other
entities that sought to challenge a state or federal government election
regulation. 20 5 The challenges ranged from questioning a state's ballot
access law to campaign finance disputes to Voting Rights Act litigation.
Thus, the analysis of district court adjudication of these disputes paints a
fairly broad picture of the state of election law for 2004 and 2008, the
last two presidential election years.
In 2004, federal district courts determined the validity of a local,
2 6
state, or federal government election action in seventy-seven cases. 0
The courts struck down at least part of a state's election law practice
thirty-one times, ruling entirely in favor of the government in the
remaining forty-six cases.20 7 That is, the state's success rate in having its
election law decision upheld in its entirety was approximately 59.7%.208
For comparison to 2008, when confining the time period to March 18,
2004 (the date in 2008 of the Washington State Grange decision) to the
end of 2004, the district courts struck down an election law at least in
part twenty-seven times and ruled entirely for the state in thirty-eight
cases, giving the state a 58.4% success rate during this period.20 9
In 2008, federal district courts rendered eighty-six decisions that
considered whether the governmental entity in question had gone too far
in its election regime.210 The court upheld the government's practice in
its entirety fifty-four times and granted at least some relief thirty-two
times. 21 1 Thus, the governmental entity had a success rate of
approximately 62.3% for all of 2008.212 After Washington State Grange,
district courts struck down at least part of an election law in twenty-eight
cases and upheld the law in its entirety forty-one times, giving the state a
59.4% success rate during this time period.21 3 In several of the cases in
usually referred to as the plaintiffs likelihood of prevailing-is an important, perhaps the most

important, factor in determining whether the plaintiff can obtain preliminary relief'). Therefore,
suits seeking injunctive relief provide an indication regarding whether the government's election
regime is lawful. They are thus appropriate to include in a discussion of whether courts have looked

more favorably upon the current governmental practice in an election law case.
205. In several cases, the plaintiff was the United States, bringing Voting Rights Act claims
against covered jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06 Civ. 15173,

2008 WL 190502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008); United States v. Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp.
2d 1016,
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

1017-18 (D. Colo. 2004).
See app. tbl.5, supra note
See app. tbl.5,
supra note
See app. tbl.5, supra note
See app. tbl.5,
supra note
See app. tbl.6, supra note
See app. tbl.6, supra note
See app. tbl.6, supra note
See app. tbl.6, supra note

163.
163.
163.
163.
163.
163.
163.
163.
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which the plaintiffs won, the relief was through as-applied, not facial,
challenges.2 14 In at least one case, the court rejected a facial challenge by
using the principles from Washington State Grange and Crawford
without actually citing those decisions, showing how lower courts have
mimicked the Supreme Court's attitude toward facial challenges even if
the district courts did not directly cite these cases.2 15

All cases
decided in
2004
Cases decided
between Mar.
18, 2004 and
Dec. 31, 2004
All cases
decided in
2008
Cases decided
between Mar.
18, 2008
(Washington
State Grange)
and Dec. 31,
2008

At Least Part of
Law Invalidated

Law Upheld
in Its Entirety

Government's
Success Rate

31

46

59.7%

27

38

58.4%

32

54

62.3%

28

41

59.4%

Table 3: Federal District Courts Invalidation of Election Laws, 2004
and 2008
Although the numbers are almost identical, the cases reveal more
than the raw data may indicate. Combined with the discussion of the
decisions that cite Washington State Grange and Crawford for the asapplied rule, this analysis suggests that plaintiffs may now have a harder
time achieving broad relief in an election law case. Of course, this trend

214. See, e.g., Ohio Right to Life Soc'y v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, Case No. 2:08-cv-00492,
2008 WL 4186312, at * 11-12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008); Citizens for Police Accountability Political
Comm. v. Browning, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172-74 (M.D. Fla. 2008). But see Nat'l Right to Work
Legal Def. & Educ. Found., Inc. v. Herbert, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1154-55 (D. Utah 2008) (striking
down a campaign finance law both on its face and as-applied).
215. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 3:08-CV-483, 2008 WL
4416282, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2008).
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may stem from a number of factors, and the sample size may not be
large enough to draw definitive conclusions. Regardless, although there
has not been a major shift, the consequences of Washington State
Grange and Crawford are not unnoticeable. For example, even if
plaintiffs secure a ruling that the government's action is unlawful, that
relief is likely to be narrower because courts are constrained from ruling
upon the facial validity of a law. 216 That is, the almost identical numbers
of district court decisions in 2004 and 2008 do not take into account the
type of relief currently available to plaintiffs, which the as-applied only
rule from Washington State Grange and Crawford circumscribes.
Additionally, it is impossible to measure how many cases were never
filed as a result of potential plaintiffs' apprehension about the as-applied
approach in Washington State Grangeand Crawford.This data therefore
underrepresents the potential effect of these decisions. Nevertheless,
given what we know about the shifting paradigm from Washington State
Grange and Crawford, one eminently logical conclusion is that the
federal courts have taken the cue that states should be freer to conduct
their elections as they see fit. In short, stemming from Washington State
Grange and Crawford, there is a general sentiment in the federal courts
to construe election law statutes narrowly and in the government's favor.
Here is the upshot: When lower courts cite Washington State
Grange, and to a lesser extent, Crawford,they are likely to do so for the
proposition that plaintiffs must limit election law challenges to asapplied suits. This comports with the Roberts Court's general disfavor
for facial challenges to all sorts of statutes.21 7 At the same time, voters
are finding it slightly more difficult to challenge a state's election
regulation, particularly in the federal courts of appeals, beyond perhaps
achieving minor narrow victories for a specific application. This, in turn,
affects who chooses to bring suit, as those who believe they will secure
218
only modest relief are unlikely to endure the hassles of a lawsuit.
Whether there is a direct causation or a mere correlation between these
Supreme Court cases and the general trend in election law jurisprudence
is not yet clear. In any event, there is an observable, albeit gradual and
minor, trend toward making it more difficult for voters to win lawsuits
216. See supranote 215 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable
Through Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 563, 573-90 (2009); David L. Franklin,
Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36

HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 694-95 (2009).
218. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1645 (noting that voting advocacy groups may
be less likely to spend the time and money to challenge an election law if they are likely to achieve
only narrow and specific success).
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that broadly challenge a state's election regime. Thus, instead of a sea
change in election law, Washington State Grange and Crawford
represent a modest-yet still alarming-movement. Judges, who
determine the scope of the right to vote, have used the procedural hurdle
of rejecting facial challenges to tip the scale in favor of the state, making
it more difficult to broadly challenge a governmental entity's election
law practice.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREND TOWARD ALLOWING ONLY

As-APPLIED ADJUDICATION

The preceding analysis underscores the main thesis of my
scholarship: The meaning of the "right to vote" is wholly dependent on
how Supreme Court Justices, and as a corollary, lower federal judges,
define that right. 2 19 During every election cycle, federal judges confront
myriad election-related cases. The manner in which the judges construe
those challenged laws provides guidance on the scope of protection for
the right to vote. 220 Thus, in the 1960s, Supreme Court Justices sought to
widely protect the right to vote; this era was the peak of judicial
protection of the franchise. 22 1 The current Court, by contrast, has
provided less protection to an individual's right to vote, tipping the
balance toward the states in regulating their elections. My research
demonstrates one manner in which the Justices have done so: through
limiting challenges to a state's election regime to only as-applied
litigation.
This analysis leads to two conclusions. First, judges have
tremendous power in shaping democratic principles, and, by extension,
the meaning of our system of self-governance. Second, the Court's
current focus on as-applied challenges should cause some apprehension
about the role of the Court in election law disputes. As I further examine
in Part V, given these practical concerns stemming from the approach in
219. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (2009) (questioning the fundamentality of the "right to vote" in the face of
conflicting adjudicatory standards) [hereinafter Douglas, Right to Vote]; Joshua A. Douglas, Note, A
Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court's Severe Burden Test for State Election Regulations
That Adversely Impact an Individual'sRight to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 372 (2007) (assessing
the "severe burden test" in light of cases stemming from the 2004 presidential election).
220. Professor Metzger explains that the impact of the Roberts Court's focus on as-applied
litigation generally depends on the content of the substantive constitutional doctrine involved.
Metzger, supra note 118. As I show, given the power of the Justices in defining political rights, the
facial/as-applied distinction in the election law context has a direct impact on the meaning of the
right to vote.
221. See supra Part ll.B.
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Washington State Grange and Crawford, the Supreme Court should
abolish the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and
instead adopt the overbreadth doctrine for election law cases.
A.

The Role of Judges in Shaping Democratic Self-Governance

One underlying theme of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Washington State Grange and Crawford is that judges have tremendous
power in defining the meaning of political participation. Professors
Elmendorf and Foley recently provided a theoretical backbone to my
theory that judges are uniquely responsible for shaping the right to
vote. 22 These professors considered the Court's varying analytical
approaches to election law cases during the 2007 Term 22 3 and concluded
that the Justices generally are more concerned with the practical
implications of their decisions than with having a consistent and
coherent approach.22 4 As Professor Elmendorf and Professor Foley
write,
Our tentative view is that this methodological pluralism, coupled with
a lack of explicit normative direction, tends to suggest that most
Justices (even Scalia) approach constitutional election law thinking
less about doctrinal coherence or interpretive principle than about the
implications of their rulings for the system of government as a whole.
The Justices sense that constitutional adjudication has an important
role to play in legitimating the ground rules of electoral competition,
notwithstanding that the text of the Constitution and conventional
225
historical sources do very little to define the scope of political rights.
Thus, the Justices are mostly concerned with the practical effects of
their election law decisions. This comports with my notion that the
Justices shape the meaning of the right to vote through their largely ad
hoc approach to election law cases.226 That is, the "right to vote" is not
an abstract, amorphous concept or a well-defined, consistent principle;
instead, it is simply whatever the current Supreme Court Justices say it
is.
By rejecting virtually all facial challenges, the Court has signaled
that most election laws probably pass muster for at least one election

222.

See Elmendorf& Foley, supra note 107, at 537.

223. Id. at 517-29.
224. Id. at 537.
225.
226.

Id.
See sources cited supra note 217.
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cycle.227 In essence, the default is that a particular regulation will impose
228
no constitutionally-suspect burden on voters or other political actors.
The Court starts out with the foundation that the state has promulgated a
constitutional election scheme, making it virtually impossible to imagine
an election law that the Court would strike down on its face before it can
see how the law actually works in practice. 229 The rights of political
actors, particular voters, candidates, or minor political parties become
derogated in the process, because they are unable to vindicate their rights
until they can provide concrete and specific evidence on the actual effect
of the law.2 3°
Currently, the Justices believe that when the right to vote abuts the
power of the state, the state should usually win. 23 1 The byproduct is a
derogation of protection for actors in the political process. The Court has
sent the signal that states have almost unfettered discretion in regulating
their elections. Any relief voters or others achieve will likely be at the
margins and narrow in scope through piecemeal as-applied litigation.
Further, as one commentator noted, the reality of this approach is that
voters might never achieve relief because, even though the Court left
open the possibility of as-applied challenges in theory, voters will be
unlikely to succeed in practice.23 2 In Washington State Grange and
227. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1666-67 (noting that "[t]he effect of the Court's
decision [in Washington State Grange] is to force plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm (in this case,
confused voters in an election) in order to generate evidence as to the law's unconstitutionality");
see also Metzger, supra note 118; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1666 (noting that the effect
of the push to as-applied challenges in election law is to make some voting rights claims more
difficult to bring).
228. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanationsand Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 313, 322 (2007) (arguing that "scrutiny levels
[in election law cases] depend on presumptive, first-pass determinations regarding the constitutional
status (permissible or impermissible) of the challenged law").
229. Chief Justice Roberts attempted to refute this notion in his concurrence in Washington
State Grange,stating that the ballot design itself-which a political party could challenge before the
election-would be the dispositive point. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
128 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
230. Of course, there may also be a positive practical effect of this default rule, as it gives
election administrators wide leeway in trying out new voting technologies. See Daniel P. Tokaji,
The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1711, 1716
(2005) ("[Mandating a uniform voting technology] can also be expected to stifle innovation by
locking in a particular type of security enhancement, while discouraging other possibilities that may
be more effective and easier to implement."). Thus, a particular election mechanism may burden
voters in the first instance, but the by-product is that governments may innovate in how they run
elections.
23 1. See Persily, supra note 7, at 109 (noting the general restraint the Roberts Court has
exercised over election laws, with the exception of campaign finance regulations).
232. See Vikram David Amar, What the Supreme Court's Recent Decision Upholding
Indiana's Voter ID Law Tells Us About the Court, Beyond the Area of Election Law, FINDLAW,
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Crawford, the Court sent this veiled message through the lens of
rejecting facial challenges. The Justices currently in the majority-most
often the conservative members of the Court-provided protection to
states' election regimes through a judicial gloss on the types of lawsuits
political actors can bring to vindicate their rights. Lower courts, sensing
this message, began to follow suit and more often ruled for the state in
an election challenge. The change is gradual, as we see from the effects
of Washington State Grange and Crawford, but this does not diminish
its importance. In short, the facial/as-applied dichotomy says a lot about
how the protection for the right to vote depends on the way in which
judges use judicial rules to shape election law litigation.
This conclusion holds true for various aspects of election law, from
requiring voters to show photo identification to regulating political
parties to having onerous voter registration rules. Professor Tokaji noted
that if lower courts follow the Supreme Court's recent "high bar for
plaintiffs seeking to mount ... facial challenge[s]," voters will have a
very difficult time obtaining pre-election relief when challenging a
restriction on registration.233 This is because any relief is possible only
after voters suffer a violation of their constitutional rights during an
election and then can demonstrate the effect of the law as applied to
them. The upshot is that states have much greater power in regulating
their elections, which can lead to partisan election officials skewing the
state's rules in their favor.2 34
Persily and Rosenberg recently provided an explanation for the
Court's strict adherence to as-applied litigation for election law that
focuses directly on the process of judicial decision-making on the
Supreme Court.235 They argue that the trend toward as-applied
adjudication is consistent with an under-the-surface mechanism to
constrain unfavorable precedent and rework statutory meaning. 236 For
example, Persily and Rosenberg suggest that in Federal Election

May 8, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20080508.html (noting that the practical reality of the
Court's decision in Crawfordis that "for some claims and right-holders, it's facial challenge or bust.
Thus, in turning away facial challenges in cases like these, the Court may seem to be leaving a path
for as-applied challenges, but in practice, it may well be effectively foreclosing any meaningful
challenge at all.").
233. Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
453, 489-90 (2008).

234. See id. at 491 ("To the extent courts deny standing to plaintiffs in these cases or restrict
the availability of facial challenges, there is great potential for mischief on the part of partisan
elected or appointed officials.").
235. See generally Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7.
236. Id.
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Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life ("WRTL"),

237

the Court ruled
almost all activity under the campaign finance statute unconstitutional as
applied so as to work around a previous decision rejecting a facial
challenge,2 38 thereby "carv[ing out] an exception to the law that is as
large as the legislative record justifying it."'239 Persily also contends that

the as-applied approach helped to build consensus for the majority ruling
in both Washington State Grange and Crawford, as the Justices who
were "on the fence" felt that they could condone an opinion that left the
door open to future challenges.24 °
Persily and Rosenberg's analysis shows how the facial/as-applied
debate affects the internal decision-making in these cases. 241 What the

Justices fail to explicitly acknowledge (or perhaps even realize) is that
these rules have stark practical effects on the political process. For
example, in Crawford, Justice Stevens might have believed that a
decision rejecting facial challenges to voter identification laws but
allowing future as-applied litigation was an appropriate compromise
given the approach of his conservative colleagues.24 2 Taking this more
incrementalist strategy would produce a far more palatable outcome than
a starker opinion denying all possible relief, as Justice Scalia advocated
in his Crawford concurrence.243 That is, Justice Stevens might have
believed that writing the controlling opinion so as to leave the door open
to as-applied litigation was a better strategy than being in the dissent to
an opinion that rejected all possible challenges to a voter identification
law. But as a result of the Crawford majority, lower courts seem to be
narrowing their decisions and ruling in favor of the state more often
because of the signals the Supreme Court has sent. Thus, if Justice
237.
238.

127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).
Compare id.at 2659, with McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 157 n.52

(2003). McConnell had left the door open to an as-applied challenge to the law. See McConnell, 540
U.S. at 157 n.52.

239. Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1661. Persily and Rosenberg note that in this way,
the Court "can say that [the statute] is constitutional in theory, but rarely in practice." 1d.; accord
Persily, supra note 7, at 94 (explaining further how Chief Justice Roberts sought consensus in

election law cases through a renewed focus on the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges); see also Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MiNN. L. REV. 1064, 1085-91 (2008) (discussing the
incongruity between McConnell and WRTL).

240. Persily, supra note 7, at 94 (suggesting that this approach "appeals to those on the fence
who view siding with the majority as a small and perhaps reversible step, rather than the creation of
a sweeping rule of law").
241.
242.
243.

Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1657-72.
Persily, supra note 7, at 104.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in the judgment).
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Stevens's ruling was an attempt to cabin a harsher result for the rights of
voters, his strategy may have backfired through the lower courts'
application of these rules. In this way, the rejection of all facial
challenges has created unintended negative consequences stemming
directly from the power that the Supreme Court has in shaping political
rights. If anything, the effects of Washington State Grange and
Crawfordshow that the Court is not a passive bystander but rather is the
institution with the most power to define the scope of the right to vote,
even if the rules it promulgates can be understood as a means of internal
decision-making.
Thus, the decisions in Washington State Grange and Crawford
represent a gradual trend of today's Supreme Court Justices toward
narrow judicial protection for those who seek to challenge a state
election regulation. The Court did not say so explicitly in these
decisions, but by closing the door to virtually all facial challenges, the
Court is placing a high burden on voters and others who seek to
vindicate their rights. This burden is in stark contrast to the rules of the
1960s, when the Supreme Court allowed facial challenges to election
laws and thereby encouraged sweeping electoral change. Unpacking
these trends leads to a realization that individual Justices have immense
power in defining the most basic right in our democracy.
Recognizing the power of individual Justices and judges to shape
the right to vote also leads to further lessons for the study of election
law. Scholars should remain intensely attuned to the unintended and
unstated consequences of Supreme Court decisions in this area because
they have significant repercussions for the functioning of our
democracy. This analysis allows us to divorce ourselves from attempting
to glean an overarching principle for all election law jurisprudence,
instead requiring us to focus on the idiosyncrasies of the individual
Justices and their approaches to these cases. The effects of Washington
State Grange and Crawford show that what the Justices say actually
matters a great deal to the current scope of political rights. It also signals
that the make-up of the Supreme Court has a huge impact on the scope
of the right to vote: The right to vote is simply whatever the nine current
Supreme Court Justices say it is. The everyday rules of election law are
not usually contentious topics during a prospective Justice's nomination
hearing;2 44 realizing that the Court is actually the most significant arbiter
244. During Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Alito's confirmation hearings, the Senate
Judiciary Committee members asked both nominees general questions about the right to vote. See
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the United
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. 170-173 (2005) (questioning from Senator
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in shaping political rights suggests that we should scrutinize nominees
more closely on this topic. In sum, Washington State Grange and
Crawford represent an important but often overlooked trend: Justices
and judges have great power in shaping political rights through
"everyday" rulings in election law cases.
B. A Causefor Concern
For those who believe that election law should be mostly about
vindicating group rights and ensuring that leaders do not become
entrenched, this shift toward allowing only as-applied challenges-and
the accompanying trend toward upholding state election regulationsshould cause immense concern. Structuralists generally believe that the
role of the courts is to safeguard against partisan leaders using the
political process to entrench themselves in the majority.245 As Professor
Pamela Karlan observes, the Supreme Court "deploys the Equal
Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of
individuals... but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements

Kennedy); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court ofthe United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong.
380 (2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings of Alito] (questioning from Senator Kohl). No
Senator pressed either nominee on more core values regarding the meaning of the right to vote or
the role judges should play in shaping a state's powers in managing an election. Although some
committee members questioned Roberts on the Voting Rights Act, the most robust discussion of
election law during Justice Alito's confirmation hearing occurred when Professor Samuel
Issacharoff testified before the committee on the principles underlying the "one person-one vote"
rule, advising the Senate that it should assure itself that any Supreme Court nominee would "assume
the full responsibility of protecting the integrity of our democratic processes." Confirmation
Hearings ofAlito, supra, at 689.
245. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 510, 523 (2004) (arguing that an individualistic
perspective makes little sense because the Court is required to make value judgments about how to
structure a democratic election and in the process decide important structural issues such as the role
of political parties, the power of minority groups, or the appropriate amount of competition);
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 648 (1998) ("Where there is an appropriately robust market in
partisan competition, there is less justification for judicial intervention. Where courts can discern
that existing partisan forces have manipulated these background rules, courts should strike down
those manipulations in order to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan environment.");
Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J.
685, 688 (2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003))

(stating that "of the various structural goals of democracy, the one courts ought to focus on is
ensuring competition and, through it, electoral accountability"); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are
Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725,
731 (1998).
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within which politics is conducted., 246 Under this view, the role of the
judiciary is to regulate the proper relationship between political
institutions and to limit the exercise of state power when used to achieve
anti-competitive ends.247
The Court's practice in Washington State Grange and Crawford,
however, was to rubberstamp a state's electoral scheme, at least for one
election, until a voter or political party can gather enough evidence on
how the law actually operates in the context of a real election. This
provides a great incentive for state officials-who are traditionally selfinterested by virtue of election to their positions-to shape the rules of
the game to benefit their political persuasion.24 8 Thus, not only is the
Court under-protecting those who challenge the state's actions, it is also
failing to ensure that those in power do not use that power for unfair
means.
It may not seem like much when the Court states that "facial
challenges are best when infrequent." 249 When the Court applied this
rule to election law, however, it signaled that the balance of power
tipped heavily toward the state in managing an election, impacting the
meaning of self-governance. Lower courts take notice, and even if they
do not specifically cite this rule, they are more likely to reject a
plaintiff's argument in an election law case. In the process, the Court
fails to achieve the structuralist ideal of warding off entrenchment.
Moreover, based upon this seemingly procedural rule of rejecting
facial challenges, the current Court has effectively said that the scope of
the right to vote is quite narrow. If the Court continues down this path,
246. See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001).
247. See Issacharaoff& Pildes, supra note 245, at 717-18.
248. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF
DEMOCRACY 64 (rev. 2d ed. & Supp. 2005) (highlighting "the always present risk that election
regulations enacted by self-interested legislatures can be a vehicle for incumbent or partisan
protection"); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,
and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1248 (2005) (suggesting that, in the
absence of "clear [state] rules," local election administrators may apply rules that benefit their
preferred candidate or hurt the candidates they oppose); Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Upholds
Voter ID Statute, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1984 (2007) (noting that simply deferring to legislatures
in a voter identification case is "an especially worrisome choice given the concern that election
regulations may be passed to entrench the very legislators creating them"); see also Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("Although the State has a legitimate-and indeed critical-role to play in regulating elections, it
must be recognized that it is not a wholly independent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is itself
controlled by the political party or parties in power, which presumably have an incentive to shape
the rules of the electoral game to their own benefit.").
249. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
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we can expect to see it rejecting many more challenges to state election
regimes, and states likely will continue to impose obstacles to political
participation. The stated reasons for imposing these burdens might be to
enhance efficiency or ward off election fraud, but partisan election
officials also can use their electoral schemes to shape the rules of the
game-with little concern for court interference. When a voter,
candidate, or political party does obtain relief, that relief is likely to have
little impact on voting rights as a whole; a court is much more likely to
uphold a law on its face but strike down the state's specific application
of the law to that plaintiff. The voter or candidate might have his or her
rights vindicated for that election, but the state can still apply the law to
others or tweak it to carve out the unconstitutional portion. Under this
approach, the Court's decisions are unlikely to initiate wholesale
changes in how states run their elections.
This all comes at the expense of those who burdensome laws are
most likely to adversely affect: minority voters, third-party candidates,
and minor political parties. Due to their place in the minority, they are
already disadvantaged in the electoral system. If they were in the
majority, theoretically they could shape the rules of the game through
electoral procedures-which courts are now less likely to curtail.
Instead, they must resort to the judiciary to vindicate their rights. But
they might not find success there, as the Supreme Court has narrowed
the ability of these political actors to challenge a state's election rules.
The effects of the "as-applied only" rule of Washington State
Grange and Crawford are in their infancy. The data of lower federal
court decisions suggests that there is a slight, yet still perceptible, trend
toward more easily upholding a state's election scheme. 250 The concern
is that as states realize the implications of Washington State Grange and
Crawford, they might try to become even more innovative in
promulgating election regulations that will entrench the majority. Those
adversely affected-minority voters and candidates-will bear a greater
burden in challenging these regulations. Thus, although the data
comparing 2004 and 2008 do not show a large change, if the trend
continues, it seems likely that the pendulum will swing even further
toward the state during the next election cycle. The Supreme Court in
Washington State Grange and Crawford was the catalyst for this shift.
The by-product is a failure to achieve structuralist goals or ward off
entrenchment, underscoring once again the power of Supreme Court
Justices in defining what it means to have a "right to vote."
250. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
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V.

ABOLISHING THE FACIAL/AS-APPLIED DISTINCTION

FOR ELECTION LAW CASES AND ADOPTING THE
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE IN ITS PLACE

Acknowledging that Justices and judges have a particularly unique
role in defining the right to vote and recognizing that recent decisions
have in effect curtailed that right leads to the conclusion that courts
should relax the procedural-type requirements for this area of law.
Courts must be ever vigilant to ensure that states are not infringing upon
the right to vote, given that courts shape democratic principles. Because
voting is so important to our notion of self-governance, there is reason
for added judicial scrutiny of election laws. Requiring as-applied
challenges mutes this scrutiny because it allows governmental entities to
promulgate laws that will be in effect until a plaintiff can show the
actual consequences of the law, which is usually possible only after at
least one election under that regulation. As a result, voters and others
may suffer an infringement of their rights.
My research shows the practical and adverse effects of the Court's
2 51
recent approach in Washington State Grange and Crawford.
Persily
and Rosenberg opine that the Court should relax the standard for facial
challenges with the goal of facilitating clarity, acknowledging the
irreparability of an injury that often occurs, and keeping in mind the
costs to the individual when bringing a suit.25 2 They suggest that courts
should prefer facial challenges to as-applied challenges in election law
and advocate "something akin to 'substantial overbreadth"' in the
election law context. 253 It was beyond the scope of their article, however,
to describe in detail how a new overbreadth-type test might work. At a
general level, they suggest that any remedy must include a greater ability
for political actors to gain prospective relief so that they need not wait
implements an onerous election regulation to
until a state actually
254
challenge that law.
My solution is more drastic: The Court should eradicate any
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges for election law. 255
251. See supraPart IV.
252. Persily & Rosenberg, supranote 7, at 1672-73.
253. Id.
at 1674.
254. See id. at 1672-74.
255. But see United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that "it is
hard to believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied challenges for one particular area of
constitutional law"), vacated and remanded by United States v. Stewart, 545 U.S. 1112 (2005).
Professor Fallon suggests that although courts almost always require as-applied challenges, the
practical effect of the courts' decisions is to invalidate a law in its entirety. See Fallon, supra note
14, at 1327-28 ("In order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a litigant must always assert
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The lens of facial or as-applied challenges has few practical advantages

for election law cases; it does not assist courts in more easily disposing
of election-related disputes or reduce election litigation. Instead, it
makes it harder to glean clear rules about what types of electoral
schemes are permissible and, practically speaking, forbids voters from
achieving pre-election prospective relief. Accordingly, courts should
simply determine whether a state's election practice-given the facts
before the court-is permissible.

The Supreme Court has disfavored facial challenges for several

256
reasons. First, "claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation."

Second,
Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of
judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor
than is required by the
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
25 7
precise facts to which it is to be applied.
Finally, "facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic
from being
process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people
258

implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.',

The importance of protecting the right to vote and encouraging

political participation tempers these concerns in the election law context.
If a plaintiff with standing is able to show that a law that affects voting
rights is invalid with respect to either him- or herself or some other

political actor, then there is no reason for the court to rubberstamp the
law or pass on deciding its constitutionality. As Justice Scalia noted in

his concurrence in Crawford, "[t]his is an area259where the dos and don'ts
need to be known in advance of the election.,
that the statute's applicationto her case violates the Constitution. But when holding that a statute
cannot be enforced against a particular litigant, a court will typically apply a general norm or test
and, in doing so, may engage in reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality. In a
practical sense, doctrinal tests of constitutional validity can thus produce what are effectively facial
challenges. Nonetheless, determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as
logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular
facts."); see also David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41 (2006) (examining the trend toward allowing only facial challenges for
Commerce Clause cases); Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge "On
Its Face": Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand FacialChallenges, 55 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 161 (2004) (same).
256. Wash. State Grange. v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
257. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
258. Id.
259. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Of course, Justice Scalia made this statement in conjunction with his
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Therefore, the Court should abolish the facial/as-applied distinction
for these cases and, in its place, incorporate the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine into election law. 260 The overbreadth doctrine
allows a court to vindicate others' rights when the right is important
enough to enjoy widespread and special protection. Facial overbreadth
applies to speech because of the importance of free speech to our
democracy. 261 A law is overbroad if it "does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute
an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. 262 The Court has
determined that protecting speech is so vital that we should allow a
plaintiff to vindicate the free speech rights of others. The overbreadth
doctrine also helps 263
to ensure that laws will not have a chilling effect on
expressive conduct.

The right to vote, which is at the core of the political process,
should similarly receive this special kind of protection. Self-governance
begins at the voting booth; all citizens have a stake in ensuring that our
democracy functions fairly. Given the importance of voting, we should
be extremely concerned about the chilling effect of a law that suppresses
political participation. For example, a person who might be exempted
from showing a photo identification based upon the Court's reasoning in
Crawford might choose not to go to the voting booth because he or she
incorrectly believes that the law validly applies to all voters. The Court
should not allow a state to infringe upon the rights of some voters simply
because those voters have not brought suit; instead, the Court should
determine which applications are permissible and strike down those
applications that are unconstitutional. It follows that a plaintiff should be
able to bring suit to vindicate all voters' rights to protect the foundation
of the political process. That is, given the unique importance of the right
to vote, courts should decide election law disputes without the guise of
the facial or as-applied approach and instead should invoke the
argument that the Court should reject all challenges to the voter identification law and hold that it
never can be invalid as applied. See id.
260. See Gans, supra note 13, at 1342-43, 1361 ("Courts ...need not wait for the statute's first
application to constitutionally protected speech to determine its facial validity. Courts will enjoin an
overbroad law at the behest of the first challenger."); see also Decker, supra note 45, at 81-82
(suggesting that the Court implicitly used the overbreadth doctrine in at least one case involving the
right to vote: Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)); id. at 103-04 (advocating for the
Court to adopt the overbreadth doctrine for all fundamental rights).
261. See Dorf, supranote 14, at 261-62.
262. Thonhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
263. See id.; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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overbreadth doctrine. As Professor Dorf explained, "the First
Amendment
is not alone in preserving an open democratic political
' 264
regime.

An overbreadth doctrine for election law is not unprecedented. The
Supreme Court implicitly invalidated the poll tax at issue in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections by using an overbreadth analysis. 265 That is,
the Court struck down the law without inquiring into whether the
plaintiffs themselves were able to pay the tax. 266 As Professor Dorf
observes, "[t]he Harper Court thereby implicitly extended
overbreadth
267
analysis to a non-First Amendment, nonlitigation right.,
Similarly, in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,268 Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that requiring a political party to "preclear" a
change in the way it selected its nominees was an overbroad application
of the Voting Rights Act. 69 Instead of refusing to pass upon
"hypothetical" situations, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court should
determine whether applying Section Five of the Voting Rights Act to
political parties infringed upon the right to freedom of association in a
substantial number of other contexts not necessarily before the Court.270
Justice Scalia also has suggested overbreadth analysis for campaign
finance regulations because those laws implicate First Amendment
associative rights.27'
Of course, Justice Scalia's "facial" approach to election laws is
actually contrary to the protection of voters-as he demonstrated in
Crawford when arguing that the Court should uphold the voter
264. Doff, supra note 14, at 264.
265. 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
266. Dorf, supra note 14, at 267-68.
267. Id. at 267. Professor Doff goes on to consider and reject three possible objections to his
analysis. First, he explains that the right to vote is not really a First Amendment right in this
situation, so the Court was not simply applying traditional First Amendment overbreadth analysis.
Id. Second, he rejects the contention that a plaintiff would have a personal stake in her ability to
vote without a poll tax even if she could pay it and therefore would not need to bring an overbreadth
challenge. Id. at 267-68. Finally, Doff dismisses the argument that because the Court struck down
the law in its entirety on equal protection grounds, the decision did not establish the validity of
overbreadth challenges involving fundamental rights per se. Id. at 268. Doff concludes, "In short,
Harpercan only be explained as an instance of overbreadth analysis outside the narrow context of
free speech." Id.
268. 517 U.S. 186(1996).
269. Id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2683 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Indeed, any clear rule that would protect all
genuine issue ads would cover such a substantial number of ads prohibited by § 203 that § 203
would be rendered substantially overbroad."). Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia in this opinion. See id.
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identification law in all of its applications. 272 Justice Scalia seems to

have created a presumption in favor of the state and then solidified that
presumption through facial validation, as opposed to protecting voters
through facial invalidation. But he is correct that it is important to decide
these issues before an election so that the rules are clear.2 73 It follows

that, notwithstanding the manner in which Justice Scalia has applied this
rule in election law cases, courts should extend the overbreadth doctrine
to all laws that affect political participation. This will ensure that states
cannot continue to infringe upon the right to vote in some situations
simply because the affected political actor is not before the court, while
also giving states clear rules before an election on what types of
regulations are permissible. This approach also mitigates the chilling
effect of an unconstitutional law. In sum, the Court should be proactive
in providing a limiting construction or partial invalidation when an
election law is overbroad so as to ensure protection of the right to vote
and open the democratic process to all participants.274
There are sound practical reasons to extend the overbreadth rule to
the election law setting. As one commentator has noted,
To assure vindication of not only one's personal rights but also the
rights of others whose rights are substantially threatened but whose
condition or circumstance does not permit their personal challenge, an
overbreadth doctrine that reaches the contours of all fundamental rights
is a necessity.... Human conditions or circumstances-indigence,
ignorance, illness, disability, immaturity, old age, imprisonment,
isolation, timidity, fear, and the like-often prevent a patently
unconstitutional law from being challenged by one directly affected by
the law. Third-party standing is the prophylactic that vindicates the
rights of those not before the court. Simply put, the prophylactic
minimizes application of enactments that do not measure up to a
impede exercise of
constitutionally valid rule of law but instead
275
fundamental rights to a substantial degree.
The right to vote certainly qualifies for this treatment. A rule in
favor of resolving disputes can thus provide the focus for courts to be
ever vigilant in ensuring that voting remains fair and unencumbered. The
overbreadth doctrine can help to ensure that election laws do not chill

272. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
273. See id. at 1626; Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 at 2682 n.5.
274. See Morse, 517 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Decker, supra note 45, at 103-04 (footnotes omitted).
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political participation. Accordingly, the overbreadth approach is a cogent
substitute for the facial/as-applied distinction in election law cases.
To invalidate an election regulation, the plaintiff should not have to
show that the law is unconstitutional in every instance or as applied to
that specific plaintiff; the plaintiff should only need to show that the law
is invalid as applied to some political actor, that is, that it is overbroad
because it reaches a political actor's constitutionally protected conduct
in a substantial number of contexts.276 This provides deference to those
who seek to engage in the political process. It therefore uses a judicial
rule to shift power away from the entrenched majority and vindicate the
rights of everyone who participates in self-governance.277 This should be
278
so: In a realm in which the right to vote is "preservative of all rights,"
we should err on the side of more clear and less onerous election
regulations.
Based on the overbreadth doctrine, the Court should sever an
unconstitutional application of an election law even if those infringed are
not before the court. Similar to the First Amendment context, a law that
279
infringes upon any voters' rights is, by definition, overbroad.
Unfettered political participation is too important to allow
unconstitutional applications of an election law to go unaddressed.
Concerns about open political participation and the possibility of chilling
political expression through voting should outweigh the Court's typical

276. In some ways, this is similar to Professor Monaghan's "valid rule requirement," in which
"everyone has a personal right, independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of
a constitutionally invalid statute against her." Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 3; see also Fallon, supra note 14, at 1327; Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Errorand the
Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195.
277. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1344476 (discussing the
idea that courts should employ a canon of construction that favors voters in a election law dispute).
278. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
279. Several scholars have advocated for the Court to incorporate some aspect of First
Amendment jurisprudence into election law. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity,
Electoral Structures, and the FirstAmendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L REV. 1209, 1215,
1255-62 (2003) (suggesting that the First Amendment should apply to questions of racial identity
and associational rights); David Schultz, The Party'sOver: Partisan Gerrymanderingand the First
Amendment, 36 CAP. L. REV. 1, 46-52 (2007) (suggesting that the Court should shift toward a First
Amendment analysis for claims of partisan gerrymandering); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive
Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 334-41 (1993) (promulgating a First Amendment theory for the
right to vote). Justice Kennedy has also opined that the First Amendment may be relevant in the
political gerrymandering context. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-15 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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preference, 80 through its as-applied jurisprudence, for constitutional
2

avoidance.

Of course, a plaintiff who has more concrete facts about how the
election scheme burdens the right to vote for some political actors will
be more likely to win. But if the political actor bringing suit shows that
the state's election law unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote for
someone engaged in the democratic process, then it should not matter if
the law burdens the plaintiffs rights or someone else's rights. The rules
of Article III standing will ensure that the courts are not overreaching in
analyzing a law, because the plaintiff still must have a personal stake in
the litigation to bring suit. 28 1 If a plaintiff with standing can show that

the state is infringing upon the rights of another political actor, then this
should be enough to invalidate at least the unconstitutional application of
that election regulation even if the state can validly apply the law to the
plaintiff who brought suit, much like in a First Amendment overbreadth
setting. 282
Here is how a challenge to the constitutionality of an election law
would work without the initial gloss of the facial or as-applied standard:
Suppose, as in Crawjbrd, several plaintiffs challenge a law requiring a
voter to show a photo identification to vote. Instead of asking whether
the plaintiffs are challenging the law on its face or as applied, the court
will simply determine whether the law-in any application-burdens
voters' rights. More specifically, is the law overbroad in regulating the
right to vote by reaching constitutionally protected activity in a
substantial number of contexts? Does requiring photo identification
impermissibly infringe upon the right to vote for any otherwise-eligible
voters? If the law unconstitutionally burdens the plaintiffs themselves,
then the court will invalidate the law for at least that application, because
direct evidence of the infringement is before the court. If the plaintiffs
cannot present enough evidence to show that the law unconstitutionally
infringes upon the rights of any political actor, then the court will
properly reject the plaintiffs' challenge, at least until the plaintiffs can
come up with additional evidence. 28 3 But if the plaintiffs-who have
standing--demonstrate that the photo identification requirement
280. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1652-54 (noting that concerns about a chilling
effect on protected speech reverse the typical presumption of constitutional avoidance).
281.
282.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
See Gans, supra note 13, at 134243.

283. In some ways, the requirement that the plaintiffs come forth with an appropriate amount
of evidence mimics Chief Justice Roberts's approach in Washington State Grange.See Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.

Ct. 1184, 1196-97 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring).
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infringes upon the right to vote for another group or in a slightly
different situation, or if the law chills political participation, then there is
little benefit for having a procedure-type rule that allows only as-applied
challenges. 84 In that instance, the Court should be willing to strike down
the unconstitutional applications of the law or at least interpret the
statute so as to cure the constitutional defect.285
This approach does not require wholesale invalidation of an
election law. In a recent case involving abortion rights, the Supreme
Court recognized that a court need not invalidate an unconstitutional law
in its entirety if it is possible to sever the invalid portions and stay
faithful to legislative intent. 286 Using the severability doctrine to cure the
constitutional defect of an election law allows the Court to foster open
democracy while at the same time protecting the ability of states to
constitutionally regulate their elections. Of course, if it is not possible or
would be contrary to legislative intent to sever the invalid portion, then
the Court must strike down an overbroad election law in its entirety. 287 If
it is possible to sever the unconstitutional provision, however, then
intertwining the overbreadth and severability doctrines in this way
provides the most protection for voters without requiring states to rewrite every invalid election regulation. As noted above, another
approach is to interpret the statute narrowly by excising invalid
applications so as to cure the constitutional defect. Underlying these
ideas is the concept that courts should actually decide election law
disputes and proactively determine when states are infringing upon the
right to vote instead of upholding the law on its face and waiting for an
as-applied challenge to invalidate certain applications.
The reasons for abolishing the facial/as-applied distinction and
adopting the overbreadth doctrine for election law cases are plentiful.
First, it streamlines litigation and provides the most protection for the
right to vote. Obtaining prospective relief before an election is
particularly important, as the harms that occur if a state is allowed to
enforce an unconstitutional law during an election are detrimental and
irreversible: people will be denied their legitimate right to vote and may
be chilled in exercising the franchise. If voting is "preservative of all
rights,"2 88 then it should be paramount that voters are not denied that
284. In this vein, courts would be well-served to adopt Professor Hasen's Democracy Canon.
See Hasen, supra note 277.
285. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1674.
286. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-31 (2006).
287. See id.
288. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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right, even for a single election. It also promotes the idea that voting is
one of the289 most important-indeed, fundamental-rights in our
democracy.

Second, it ensures that unlikely plaintiffs-those who are less likely
to challenge a law even though they suffer burdens under it-will
benefit from a ruling that vindicates their rights. 290 There are some
voters who will find that the burdens of challenging a law far outweigh
the benefits, even though a state's election practice is infringing their
rights.291 We should care about those voters' rights as much as every
other voters' rights, especially because a handful of votes can decide an
election.292 Therefore, as a normative matter, we should want every vote
to count so as to effectuate the goals of self-governance. Requiring only
as-applied challenges to election laws makes it less likely that courts will
protect these voters rights, because courts will refuse to invalidate laws
that might be unconstitutionally burdening these individuals until
someone brings an as-applied lawsuit. 293 The overbreadth doctrine

allows courts to vindicate the rights of all potential voters who suffer an
unconstitutional burden and helps to erase any chilling effect on political
participation stemming from an onerous election law.
Third, eradicating the facial/as-applied rule will promote clarity in
the election process. 299" When courts actually decide what types of
election regulations are permissible and what types are not,
governmental entities and those in the political process know what to
expect. For example, by rejecting the facial challenge to Indiana's voter
identification law but leaving open the possibility of as-applied
challenges, the Supreme Court simply invited additional confusion and
litigation.29 5 Can a state require an identification for elderly people who

289. See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 219, at 171-75.
290. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1674.
291.

See id

292. Witness, for example, the 2000 presidential election, which came down to 537 votes in
Florida, or the 2008 Senate election in Minnesota. See Federal Election Commission, 2000
Presidential General Election Results, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm; Schwartz,
supra note 8. The Minnesota Supreme Court only recently decided the ensuing litigation in favor of
Al Franken. See Sheehan v. Franken, No. A09-697 (Minn. June 30, 2009) (per curiam), availableat
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/sc/current/OPA090697-6030.pdf.
293. See Nihal S. Patel, Note, Weighty Considerations: Facial Challenges and the Right to

Vote, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (noting that the Court's recent approach from
Washington State Grange and Crawford"creates a situation in which states will be allowed to craft

badly-flawed election laws that have potential--even probable-unconstitutional applications and
still see them upheld on facial review").
294. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1672-73.
295.

Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2008).
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have a hard time obtaining one? Can a state mandate a photo
identification for those who religiously object to having their pictures
taken? The Court simply left these questions unanswered because it
construed the plaintiffs' lawsuit as a facial challenge to the law, even
though it recognized that there was at least some (albeit, according to the
controlling opinion, insufficient) record evidence on the burdens that the
law imposed.296 Perhaps the record was simply not developed enough to
rule upon these issues, which is one benefit of leaving these questions
for a specific as-applied challenge.2 97 But given the possibility of some
voters suffering a constitutional violation in an upcoming election, ruling
upon the legality of an election practice whenever practicable should
outweigh the desire to develop a rich record. Accordingly, if there was
enough evidence in Crawford of the burdens on certain voters (even
without a fully developed record), and if the Court had not strictly
applied the facial/as-applied rule, then it could have ruled upon the
extent to which Indiana could enforce its photo identification law in
many of the challenged settings.298 Instead, the Court used the guise of
requiring as-applied challenges to punt on these issues, sacrificing clarity
and fostering additional litigation in the process.
Closely aligned with these justifications for eliminating the
requirement that plaintiffs bring only as-applied election law challenges
are the goals of promoting equality and abolishing the stigma associated
with burdensome election regulations.299 Perhaps the most prominent
aspect of the right to vote is equality; ensuring that every vote counts

296. Id. at 1622-23.
297. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191
(2008); see also Fallon, supra note 14, at 1330-31. Justice Souter's Crawford dissent, however,
refuted the notion that there was insufficient evidence to strike down the law. See Crawford, 128 S.
Ct. at 1628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
298. Indeed, the Court's decision in Crawford led to additional litigation on the merits of a
voter identification requirement, including more litigation in Indiana. See Stewart v. Marion
County, No. 1:08-CV-586, 2008 WL 4690984, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008); see also Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M.
v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2008); Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 614 (7th
Cir. 2008); Am. Ass'n of People With Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212-23
(D.N.M. 2008); Fla. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240, 1249
(N.D. Fla. 2008); Nader v. Cronin, No. 04-00611, 2008 WL 1932284 (D. Haw. May 1, 2008).
299. See Gans, supra note 13, at 1380-81 (noting that one reason to prefer facial challenges is
to prevent a chilling effect on exercising constitutional rights and ensuring that there is not a stigma
associated with engaging in protected activity). As Professor Gans states, "Case-by-case
adjudication is likely to be too slow, requiring too many as-applied challenges to eliminate the
stigma." Id.
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equally is the cornerstone of democratic self-governance. 300 Allowing a
state to promulgate election laws that infringe upon that right for some
people-even for a single election cycle-runs counter to this goal.
Moreover, there is a societal stigma associated with being turned away
from the polls because of purported ineligibility. 30 1 It is likely that those
discouraged during the voting process may choose not to participate in
the future. In that sense, allowing a state to run its election using a law
that may be unconstitutional for some people increases the chilling effect
of the law and enhances that stigma; the right to vote becomes less
valued for these people, which is an unpalatable result-especially if
courts are simply waiting for a valid as-applied challenge to the law.
Consequently, case-by-case adjudication through as-applied challenges
is too slow to vindicate these rights.30 2
The preceding analysis shows that the Court's pigeonholing of
election law challenges into as-applied litigation has more than simply
semantic effects. There are real, practical consequences of the Court's
jurisprudence. The method by which a plaintiff can challenge an election
law affects the likelihood of a court sustaining the government's
approach to election regulation. This, in turn, impacts how people
interact with the political process and gives greater power to those
already in office to shape the rules of the game. Allowing only asapplied challenges in essence preserves the status quo, making it more
difficult to challenge inequities in voting rights. The Court's approach
shuts the courthouse door to many political actors who may wish to
challenge the manner in which we elect our leaders. At its most practical
level, then, the Court is simply protecting the government's electoral
scheme through the guise of allowing only as-applied litigation-all at
the expense of the vindication of voters' rights. Washington Stage
Grange and Crawford demonstrate the Court's power in defining the
meaning of the right to vote through procedural-type rules that have the
effect of favoring the state's electoral scheme, even if that means that
some political actors might suffer a violation of their constitutional
rights in the process. The overbreadth doctrine can help to remedy the
negative implications stemming from the rule in Washington State
Grange and Crawford.
300. See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 219, at 179 ("Laws that draw distinctions between
voters regarding the value of their votes thereby affect their individual rights and call into question
the accuracy of the election results and the efficacy of self-governance.").
301. See DENNIS J. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 25 (2004).

302.

See Gans, supranote 13, at 1381.
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CONCLUSION

It is still too early to tell if Professor Hasen was entirely correct in
predicting that the Supreme Court's rule rejecting facial challenges to
election laws will cause short-term damage to minority voters, °3 but the
evidence at least preliminarily suggests that the Court's approach has
already had an adverse effect on voters' rights. In Washington State
Grange and Crawford, the Court pigeonholed election law litigation into
as-applied challenges, which presents a significant hurdle for those
seeking to invalidate a law. At a minimum, it requires the political actor
to provide a complete data set on the actual effects of the law, which, in
many cases, is impossible to gather unless the electorate endures at least
one election under that regulation. More significantly, the Court has
signaled that the balance of power in election law cases rests squarely
with the states. This will have a disproportionate effect on minority
voters and minor political parties, who are more likely to suffer burdens
and challenge a law in the face of an entrenched majority. The Court
provided an interpretative lens through which courts must now view
election law challenges. Lower federal courts have taken notice and are
more likely to uphold a state's election regulation or at least reject a
broad constitutional challenge. Although none of the Justices indicated
that this approach would have a significant impact on election law, the
Court's decisions demonstrate its power to narrow the protections it
provides for the right to vote, thereby impacting the substantive right
involved. The Justices should be more careful in promulgating what
seem to be procedural rules, as the decisions have a tremendous effect
on shaping the political process. This analysis also demonstrates the
importance of judicial decision-making in defining the meaning of
political participation and the scope of the right to vote. Finally, at the
most practical level, this discussion calls into question the propriety of
the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges in election law
and suggests that the Court's approach does more harm than good.

VII.

EPILOGUE: NAMUDNO

Just before this Article went to print, the Supreme Court decided
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
("NAMUDNO"), 3°4 a challenge to Section Five of the Voting Rights

303. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
304. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08-322 (U.S. June 22, 2009).
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Act.3 °5 The political subdivision that brought suit, a water district in
Travis County, Texas, challenged the requirement that it "preclear" any
changes it made to its election rules with the Department of Justice or
the D.C. district court.30 6 The water district alleged both that it should be
allowed to "bail out" of the preclearance requirement and that
Congress's reauthorization of Section 5 in 2006 was unconstitutional.3 °7
After oral argument, most observers believed that the Court would
strike down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional. 30 8 It
appeared that at least five Justices would rule that Congress had not
sufficiently justified its continued imposition of preclearance on covered
jurisdictions. The commentators assumed that the bailout issue was a
non-starter because the water district was ineligible for a bailout under
the plain text of the Voting Rights Act and previous case law construing
the definition of "political subdivision., 30 9 Rejecting the water district's
bailout argument would require the Court either to uphold or strike down
the law on its face. 3t0 In short, the expectation was that Court would rule
conclusively on the law's constitutionality.
It surprised many, therefore, when the Court sidestepped the broad
constitutional question and resolved the case solely on the narrower
statutory bailout issue .3a 1 The Court stretched the statutory language and
discounted its prior case law to hold that the definition of "political
subdivision" in Section 14 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the
bailout provision in Section 4(b).312 The Court thus adopted an extremely
broad definition of "political subdivision" for purposes of bailout and
ignored
the statutory definition to avoid the constitutional question in the
13
case.

3

In light of the as-applied-only rule from Washington State Grange
and Crawford, however, the Court's resolution of NAMUDNO is hardly
remarkable. The Court's decision is entirely consistent with its recent
approach to constitutional adjudication in this area, in which it avoids
making sweeping pronouncements on the constitutionality of an election

305.
306.
307.
308.
Election
309.

42 U. S. C. § 1973c(a).
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, No. 08-322, slip op. at 5-6.
Id.
See, e.g., Rick Hasen, NAMUDNO: The Answer to My Question Appears to Be "Yes,"
Law Blog, Apr. 30, 2009, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013533.html.
See, e.g., United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110, 117-18 (1978).

310. See, e.g., Posting of Heather K. Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/
06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (June 22, 2009, 10:42 EST).
311. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, slip op. at 10-11.
312. Id.at 16.

313.

Id.
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law, instead preferring case-by-case interpretation. The water district's
bailout argument was analogous to an as-applied challenge to Section 5,
which the Court embraced to avoid analyzing the statute's facial
validity. In essence, the Court ruled that Congress could not impose
Section 5 as applied to the water district or any other political
subdivision that successfully seeks a bailout. The law remains valid as to
those who do not obtain a bailout. This conclusion necessarily
pretermitted the need to rule upon the facial validity of the statute. The
Court thus proved once again that it prefers to move slowly through
constitutional issues in election law.
At first blush, the decision in NAMUDNO seems to fall within the
previously identified worrisome trend stemming from Washington State
Grange and Crawford. In recent election law cases, the Court has
abdicated its role of providing clear guidance on the constitutionality of
election laws by avoiding broad constitutional questions. This piecemeal
approach leads to negative consequences for voters and other political
actors, particularly given the chilling effect of an unconstitutional law
that stays on the books during an election only because no one has
brought an as-applied suit.
But the consequences of avoiding the constitutional issue in
NAMUDNO are quite different because the law under review does not
regulate voters or other political actors. The Voting Rights Act burdens
not voters, candidates, or political parties but states and other covered
jurisdictions, which promulgate the rules of an election. The typical
concerns about a chilling effect on political participation are absent for
Section 5, which targets the rulemakers themselves. There is less
uneasiness surrounding the constitutional avoidance approach in
NAMUDNO than there was for the rule stemming from Washington
State Grange and Crawford, because failing to answer the tough
constitutional question in NAMUDNO does not lead to the further
infringement of voters' or others' rights. A minor burden on covered
jurisdictions that do not successfully seek a bailout-having to preclear
new election rules before implementing them-is wholly unlike the
chilling effect of an invalid law on voters who have not yet brought a
post-election as-applied challenge and who simply may decide not to
participate in an election instead of resorting to litigation. Further, a
covered jurisdiction will rarely choose not to make an election change
simply because it must seek preclearance first, especially because the
Department of Justice will approve a regulation that does not adversely
impact minority voters. Thus, there is little concern about a chilling
effect based on the "as-applied" approach in NAMUDNO.
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The Court had powerful political and institutional incentives to wait
on ruling upon the constitutionality of Section 5. By fashioning a narrow
ruling that provided dicta on the constitutional problems with the law but
resolved the case through statutory construction, the Court avoided
striking down a bastion of the civil rights movement while at the same
time providing Congress with a chance to fix the possible constitutional
defects. This ruling protects minority voters, who benefit from a
requirement that covered jurisdictions preclear any changes in voting
practices. Section 5 requires preelection approval of a new election
regulation to ensure that the change will not adversely affect voters or
others-the same goals of a rule promoting preelection judicial
resolution of a challenge to a State's election practices. Constitutional
avoidance in NAMUDNO therefore serves the goals of protecting voters
and opening the political process.
NAMUDNO affirms the Court's reluctance to invalidate an election
law on its face. The consequences of this rule are not as stark for
challenges to the Voting Rights Act as they are for challenges to state
election statutes, because constitutional avoidance in NAMUDNO
preserves federal government regulation of those who promulgate state
electoral rules. But it does suggest that the Court is being extremely
careful about ruling upon the constitutionality of a law that affects
electoral rights. Once again, we see the Court viewing its role as giving
deference to those who regulate the political process-in this case,
Congress. The Court's recent election law decisions demonstrate its
willingness to preserve the status quo, providing only incremental relief
to those who challenge an election law. Typically, the Court
rubberstamps a state's electoral practice even if it strikes down one
application, potentially leading to the infringement of voters' rights until
those voters bring a post-election as-applied suit. Although the
constitutional avoidance approach in NAMUDNO was largely the same
as in Washington State Grange and Crawford, the consequences of
NAMUDNO are quite different, because the Court's decision preserved
Congress's regulation of those who create and enforce the rules-rules
that the Court is now more likely to uphold in most settings based on its
recent as-applied methodology.
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